Police Union Contracts by Rushin, Stephen
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018 11:13 PM 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 66 MARCH 2017 NUMBER 6 
POLICE UNION CONTRACTS 
STEPHEN RUSHIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article empirically demonstrates that police departments’ 
internal disciplinary procedures, often established through the 
collective bargaining process, can serve as barriers to officer 
accountability.  
  Policymakers have long relied on a handful of external legal 
mechanisms like the exclusionary rule, civil litigation, and criminal 
prosecution to incentivize reform in American police departments. In 
theory, these external legal mechanisms should increase the costs borne 
by police departments in cases of officer misconduct, forcing rational 
police supervisors to enact rigorous disciplinary procedures. But these 
external mechanisms have failed to bring about organizational change 
in local police departments. This Article argues that state labor law may 
partially explain this failure. Most states permit police officers to 
bargain collectively over the terms of their employment, including the 
content of internal disciplinary procedures. This means that police 
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union contracts—largely negotiated outside of public view—shape the 
content of disciplinary procedures used by American police 
departments. 
  By collecting and analyzing an original dataset of 178 union 
contracts from many of the nation’s largest police departments, this 
Article shows how these agreements can frustrate police accountability 
efforts. A substantial number of these agreements limit officer 
interrogations after alleged misconduct, mandate the destruction of 
disciplinary records, ban civilian oversight, prevent anonymous 
civilian complaints, indemnify officers in the event of civil suits, and 
limit the length of internal investigations. In light of these findings, this 
Article theorizes that the structure of the collective bargaining process 
may contribute to the prevalence of these problematic procedures. It 
concludes by considering how states could amend labor laws to 
increase transparency and community participation in the negotiation 
of police union contracts.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2014, police encountered seventeen-year-old Laquan 
McDonald carrying a three-inch blade and breaking into vehicles in 
southwest Chicago.1 Officers on the scene claimed that McDonald 
advanced toward them, swinging the knife in an “aggressive, 
exaggerated manner,”2 forcing Officer Jason Van Dyke to shoot and 
kill McDonald in self-defense.3 Like most of the other estimated 1110 
civilians killed by police officers in 2014,4 McDonald’s death initially 
received little media attention. That all changed in November 2015, 
when a county judge ordered Chicago officials to release dash-camera 
footage of the event.5 The video shocked many Chicago residents and 
spurred a federal investigation of the Chicago Police Department.6 
The video showed that McDonald never charged the officers.7 In 
fact, McDonald appeared to be walking away from them when Van 
 
 1. Steve Mills et al., Laquan McDonald Police Reports Differ Dramatically from Video, 
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-laquan-mcdonald-
chicago-police-reports-met-20151204-story.html [https://perma.cc/YWY9-B5RE]; Stacy St. Clair, 
Jeff Coen & Todd Lighty, Officers in Laquan McDonald Shooting Taken off Streets—14 Months 
Later, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-
chicago-police-laquan-mcdonald-officers-20160121-story.html [https://perma.cc/JL9M-C2NV] 
(explaining how the discrepancies between the police reports and the dash-cam footage in the 
Laquan McDonald case ultimately resulted in the officers involved being taken off the streets).  
 2. Mills et al., supra note 1.  
 3. Id. (noting that in the police reports, the officers involved referred to Officer Jason Van 
Dyke as VD and called McDonald “O,” shorthand for “offender”). Even after McDonald fell to 
the ground, officers claimed that he attempted to lift himself up and pointed the knife at them, 
prompting Van Dyke to fire several additional shots. Id. Based on these reports, Van Dyke’s 
supervisor ruled McDonald’s death a justifiable homicide. Id.  
 4. There are currently no national statistics on the number of individuals killed by police 
officers each year. Media outlets and private individuals have attempted to fill this gap by 
crowdsourcing and scouring media sources for reports of these sorts of deaths. See, e.g., Killed by 
Police 2014, KILLED BY POLICE, http://www.killedbypolice.net/kbp2014.html [https://perma.cc/
MS9Z-2VYV] (estimating the total number of verifiable killings of individuals by police officers 
in 2014 at 1111, including Laquan McDonald’s death).  
 5. Carol Marin & Don Mosely, Judge Orders Release of Video Showing Shooting Death of 
Chicago Teen, NBC CHI. (Nov. 19, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/national-
international/Judge-to-Decide-on-Release-of-Laquan-McDonald-Video-351741261.html 
[https://perma.cc/EQX8-XNMJ] (“Cook County Judge Franklin Valderrama told a packed 
courtroom Thursday the department must reveal the dashcam footage that capture[d] the death 
of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald in October 2014 at the hands of a white police officer.”).  
 6. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Justice Officials to Investigate Chicago Police Department 
After Laquan McDonald Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/07/us/justice-dept-expected-to-investigate-chicago-police-after-laquan-mcdonald-case.html 
[https://perma.cc/5YWL-DKVG]. 
 7. Id.  
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Dyke exited his vehicle and shot McDonald sixteen times in fourteen 
seconds from a distance of ten to fifteen feet.8 Perhaps most 
egregiously, the video showed Van Dyke firing multiple shots into 
McDonald’s lifeless body as “white puffs of smoke bec[a]me visible.”9  
This was not the first time Van Dyke’s behavior should have raised 
red flags. Since 2001, he had been the subject of more than twenty 
civilian complaints, including ten complaints about excessive use of 
force, two involving the use of firearms and one alleging the use of a 
racial slur.10 Van Dyke had more complaints than 96.7 percent of all 
Chicago police officers over that time period.11 Although Van Dyke 
had never before faced criminal charges, a jury awarded one man 
$350,000 after determining that Van Dyke “employed excessive force 
during a traffic stop.”12 Despite all of this, the Chicago Police 
 
 8. Jason Meisner, Jeremy Gorner & Steve Schmadeke, Chicago Releases Dash-Cam Video 
of Fatal Shooting After Cop Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2015, 7:14 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-laquan-mcdonald-charges-
20151124-story.html [https://perma.cc/X258-3FEA] (citing the number of shots fired by Van Dyke 
in a short period of time); Josh Sanburn, Chicago Releases Video of Laquan McDonald Shooting, 
TIME (Nov. 24, 2015), http://time.com/4126670/chicago-releases-video-of-laquan-mcdonald-
shooting [https://perma.cc/2KVT-ZJLF] (“The deadly incident occurred just before 10 p.m. on 
Oct. 20, 2014, after police were told that an individual was carrying a knife and breaking into 
vehicles on Chicago’s Southwest Side. Officers also reported that McDonald slashed the tires of 
a squad car before the shooting occurred.”). 
 9. Sanburn, supra note 8. Soon thereafter, protesters filled the streets of downtown 
Chicago. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Chicago Protests Mostly Peaceful After Video of Police 
Shooting Is Released, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/ 
chicago-officer-charged-in-death-of-black-teenager-official-says.html [https://perma.cc/9FYW-
RKPJ] (explaining that “protesters led clusters of police officers on a march through the streets 
of Chicago’s Loop, blocking intersections, chanting outside a police station and, along a major 
road to the city’s largest highways, unfurling a banner that cited deaths at the hands of the 
police”). It is also worth mentioning that the shooting of Laquan McDonald appeared to have 
contributed to the initiation of a federal investigation of the Chicago Police Department by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Davey & Smith, supra note 6 
(describing the shooting of Laquan McDonald by a Chicago police officer). Van Dyke is now 
facing murder charges for McDonald’s death, and Chicago’s Fraternal Order of Police has hired 
Van Dyke as a janitor as he awaits trial. Police Union Hires Officer Charged in Laquan McDonald 
Slaying as Janitor, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:18 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
laquanmcdonald/ct-jason-van-dyke-police-union-job-20160331-story.html [https://perma.cc/P4
DR-BFN6]. 
 10. Elliot C. McLaughlin, Chicago Officer Had History of Complaints Before Laquan 
McDonald Shooting, CNN (Nov. 26, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/25/us/jason-
van-dyke-previous-complaints-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/VQ86-TV2T]. 
 11. Of the approximately 12,000 officers working for the Chicago Police Department (CPD), 
402, or 3.35 percent, had twenty or more complaints over this time period. Id. 
 12. Id.  
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Department had never pursued disciplinary action against Van Dyke.13 
In fact, Chicago officials had not even flagged Van Dyke’s behavior as 
potentially problematic.14  
This lack of corrective action in cases of systemic officer 
misconduct is, in part, a consequence of public-employee labor law. 
Like most states, Illinois permits police officers “to bargain collectively 
with regard to policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms 
and conditions of employment.”15 Courts have interpreted phrases like 
“terms and conditions of employment” in Illinois and elsewhere to 
permit or require the negotiation of internal procedures used by police 
management to investigate or punish officers suspected of 
misconduct.16  
As part of its collective bargaining agreement with the Fraternal 
Order of Police, the union representing police officers, the City of 
Chicago has agreed “to erase decades worth of records that document 
complaints against police officers and the resolution of these 
complaints.”17 Because of this, Chicago’s Independent Police Review 
 
 13. Id. (“Five complaints in the database were ‘not sustained,’ five were unfounded, four 
resulted in exoneration, five had unknown outcomes and one resulted in no action taken.”).  
 14. Editorial, Save the Police Conduct Records, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 16, 2015,  
5:20 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-chicago-police-union-
records-edit-1217-20151216-story.html [https://perma.cc/UGA2-4TYM] [hereinafter Save the 
Police Conduct Records] (“That’s how the system failed to flag Officer Jason Van Dyke, whose 
tally of complaints rose to 20 when the database was last updated. Half of those complaints 
concerned use of force, but Van Dyke was never disciplined or even flagged as a potential 
problem.”).  
 15. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/4 (2014), invalidated in part on other grounds by Heaton 
v. Quinn, 32 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2015).  
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
 17. Save the Police Conduct Records, CHI. TRIB. supra note 14. The police department 
initially pushed back against civilian attempts to view personnel files. After a prolonged court 
battle, an appellate judge ruled that the Illinois Freedom of Information Act trumped the CPD’s 
collective bargaining agreement, requiring the release of these personnel files. Rob Wildeboer, 
Complaints Against Chicago Cops Published After 20-Year Saga, WBEZ CHI. (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.wbez.org/news/complaints-against-chicago-cops-published-after-20-year-saga-113715 
[https://perma.cc/EZJ2-CBBY] (explaining how after seven years of litigation, University of 
Chicago law professor Craig Futterman won a protective order requiring Chicago to release a 
portion of its police disciplinary records from the period between 2001 and 2015). The records 
showed that the CPD had determined that 95.34 percent of the 56,384 citizen complaints were 
unsubstantiated and required no action. Findings, CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, 
http://cpdb.co/findings [https://perma.cc/D25N-F8KV]. The most common punishment in the 
small number of substantiated complaints was a short suspension or letter of reprimand. Id. Black 
residents filed 61 percent of complaints but accounted for only 25 percent of sustained complaints; 
for white residents, the figures were 21 percent and 58 percent respectively. Id.  
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Authority does not consider an officer’s history of complaints when 
examining a new complaint against the same officer.18 The Chicago 
union contract also delays interrogations of officers involved in alleged 
wrongdoing19 and prevents the investigation of most anonymous 
complaints.20 Perhaps it is no coincidence that less than 2 percent of all 
civilian complaints against Chicago police officers result in any sort of 
disciplinary action.21  
Chicago is hardly alone. In recent years, civil rights advocates have 
uncovered a number of collective bargaining agreements that provide 
frontline officers with a laundry list of procedural protections during 
internal investigations. For example, Baltimore’s police union 
 
 The data also revealed that the police department did not provide adequate oversight of 
police officers. A large number of complaints were directed at a small number of officers (less 
than 10 percent of the CPD). Id. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was in a similar 
position in 1991. While the vast majority of LAPD officers had only one or two allegations of 
excessive force against them, some 183 officers had four or more allegations; forty-four had six or 
more; sixteen had eight or more; and one had sixteen. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE 
DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 36 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT]. Likewise, a small 
cohort of officers was involved in many of the department’s use-of-force cases. Id. at 36. The CPD 
and LAPD cases are consistent with the belief among many academics that “10 percent of . . . 
officers cause 90 percent of the problems.” Samuel Walker, Geoffrey P. Alpert & Dennis J. 
Kenney, Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Police Officer, NAT’L INST. JUST. 
RES. BRIEF, July 2001, at 1, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188565.pdf [https://perma.cc/873T-
V4AP]. 
 18. Save the Police Conduct Records, CHI. TRIB. supra note 14. 
 19. CITY OF CHI., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF POLICE 
AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CHICAGO LODGE NO. 7, at 6 (June 2, 2012) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The interview shall be postponed for a reasonable time, but in no 
case more than forty-eight (48) hours from the time the Officer is informed of the request for an 
interview and the general subject matter thereof and his or her counsel or representative can be 
present.”). 
 20. Id. at 4 (“No anonymous complaint made against an Officer shall be made the subject of 
a Complaint Register investigation unless the allegation is a violation of the Illinois Criminal 
Code, the criminal code of another state of the United States or a criminal violation of a federal 
statute.”).  
 21. CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, supra note 17 (showing that 2 percent of the 28,567 
civilian complaints submitted between 2011 and 2015 resulted in discipline). It is also worth noting 
that the DOJ has released an investigative findings report that finds the Chicago Police 
Department is engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 14141. The parties have since agreed to negotiate in good faith a consent decree to 
remedy these problems. Rebecca Hersher, DOJ: ‘Severely Deficient Training’ Has Led to Pattern 
of Abuse by Chicago Police, NPR (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/
01/13/509646186/doj-severely-deficient-training-has-led-to-pattern-of-abuse-by-chicago-police 
[https://perma.cc/J859-VWYU]. 
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contract22 includes provisions that allow for the expungement of officer 
performance records,23 bar the public disclosure of disciplinary 
actions,24 and limit civilian oversight of police officers.25 And in 
Cleveland, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) found it challenging 
to investigate the Cleveland Police Department in part because its 
 
 22. On the morning of April 12, 2015, Baltimore police arrested a twenty-five-year-old 
African American man named Freddie Gray for allegedly possessing an illegal switchblade. Eyder 
Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest, NPR (May 1, 2015,  
8:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/403629104/baltimore-protests-
what-we-know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/4B6G-8GQ2] (explaining that the 
prosecutor later confirmed that the knife was not illegal, making the stop illegal). Officers claimed 
that they did not use significant force in arresting Gray—a claim that is “mostly corroborated by 
video shot by bystanders.” David A. Graham, The Mysterious Death of Freddie Gray, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-mysterious-death-of-
freddie-gray/391119 [https://perma.cc/Z3VY-C6KB]. Video and eyewitness testimony do seem to 
confirm that Gray screamed in pain during the arrest and his legs appeared to be injured as police 
placed him in a police van. Gray also apparently requested his inhaler during the arrest—a request 
officers denied. Id. By the time Gray arrived at the police station “a half hour later, he was unable 
to breathe or talk, suffering from wounds that would kill him” the following week. Id. Gray had 
suffered a grave spinal injury similar to that experienced in serious car accidents. Scott Dance, 
Freddie Gray’s Spinal Injury Suggests ‘Forceful Trauma,’ Doctors Say, BALT. SUN (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-gray-injuries-20150420-story.html [https://perma.cc/
NBH8-4554]. Gray’s death led to criminal charges against the officers involved. See Jess Bidgood, 
Freddie Gray Trials Resume with Prosecution of 2nd Baltimore Officer, N.Y. TIMES (May  
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/us/freddie-gray-trials-resume-with-prosecution-of-
2nd-baltimore-officer.html [https://perma.cc/WR9D-54XL] (“Six police officers were charged in 
the events that preceded the death of Mr. Gray.”). But prosecutors eventually dropped the 
charges against the officers. Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with 
Zero Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN. (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.
html [https://perma.cc/HY9M-ZR8C]. 
Questions surrounding the investigation of this incident inspired civil rights advocates to 
take a closer look at the Baltimore police union contract, which governs such investigations. See 
generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT AND THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’S BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY (2015), http://
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2086432/baltimore-police-union-contract.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SYZ8-VRUX] (examining the ways that the Baltimore police union contract may impede 
effective investigation of police misconduct).  
 23. WALKER, supra note 22, at 5 (citing “Article 16, Paragraph O of the Baltimore union 
contract,” which “provides that after three years an officer can request” deletion of formal 
complaints from his or her personnel file). 
 24. Id. at 7 (citing Article 16, Paragraph K, which states that “notice of disciplinary actions 
may not be made public”).  
 25. CITY OF BALT., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CITY OF 
BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE BALTIMORE CITY LODGE NO. 3, FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE, INC. UNIT I, at 22 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that 
“[n]o civilians other than an Administrative Law Judge may serve on a Departmental Hearing 
Board”).  
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collective bargaining contract mandated the removal of disciplinary 
records from department databases after two years.26  
These examples bolster the hypothesis that some union contract 
provisions may impede effective investigations of police misconduct 
and shield problematic officers from discipline.27 Although this 
hypothesis is gaining popularity,28 virtually no comprehensive 
empirical work has examined the prevalence of such provisions in 
police union contracts across the country. This lack of research is 
troubling, as the majority of American police officers are part of labor 
unions that collectively bargain for the terms of their employment.29 
To begin filling this gap in the existing literature, this Article 
analyzes an original dataset of 178 collective bargaining agreements 
that govern the working conditions of around 40 percent of municipal 
officers in states that permit or require collective bargaining in police 
departments.30 This analysis reveals that a substantial number of these 
contracts unreasonably interfere with or otherwise limit the 
effectiveness of mechanisms designed to hold police officers 
accountable for their actions. For example, many of these contracts 
limit officer interrogations after alleged wrongdoing,31 mandate the 
destruction of officer disciplinary records,32 ban civilian oversight of 
police misconduct,33 prevent anonymous civilian complaints,34 
indemnify officers in civil suits,35 or require arbitration in cases of 
disciplinary action.36 
These findings suggest that state labor law may pose a greater 
barrier to police reform than scholars have previously recognized. For 
 
 26. Rosa Flores & Mallory Simon, Chicago’s Next Fight: Trying to Purge Police Misconduct 
Records, CNN (Dec. 20, 2015, 1:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/us/chicago-police-
misconduct-records [https://perma.cc/GTM5-QD3T]. 
 27. See WALKER, supra note 22, at 1 (“In Baltimore, and in other cities and counties across 
the country, police-union contracts contain provisions that impede the effective investigation of 
reported misconduct and shield officers who are in fact guilty of misconduct from meaningful 
discipline.”). For a discussion of existing research which has hypothesized that there is a link 
between police-union contracts and limitations on police accountability, see infra Part II.  
 28. See infra Part II.  
 29. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 30. For more information on the methodology used in this Article, see infra Part III.  
 31. See infra Part IV.A 
 32. See infra Part IV.B. 
 33. See infra Part IV.C. 
 34. See infra Part IV.D. 
 35. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.  
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decades, policymakers have based reform efforts on a handful of 
external legal mechanisms including the exclusionary rule, civil 
litigation, criminal prosecution, and structural reform litigation. These 
external mechanisms supposedly give police departments incentives to 
enact internal reforms aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of 
criminal suspects. In theory, these external legal mechanisms should 
increase the costs borne by police departments in cases of officer 
misconduct. For instance, when faced with a significant civil judgment 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rational police supervisors should respond by 
punishing any officers who engage in wrongdoing that could give rise 
to a similar judgment in the future.37  
But across many of the nation’s largest cities, supervisors cannot 
easily respond to external legal pressure by punishing problematic 
officers or implementing rigorous disciplinary procedures. Instead, 
many courts have held that internal-investigation and disciplinary 
procedures are appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under 
public-employee labor laws.38 This collective bargaining process 
happens largely outside of the public view and with minimal input from 
community stakeholders most at risk of experiencing police 
misconduct.39  
In light of these findings, this Article argues that states should 
amend labor laws to increase transparency and community 
participation in the development of police disciplinary procedures. To 
be clear, municipalities ought to provide police officers with adequate 
due process protections during internal investigations. It is also 
important for frontline police officers to have a voice in the 
development of internal policies and procedures to reduce the 
probability of organizational resistance. However, these internal 
disciplinary protections should not be so burdensome as to thwart 
legitimate efforts to investigate or punish officers engaged in 
wrongdoing.  
This Article suggests several different ways that states could 
increase transparency and public participation in the development of 
police disciplinary procedures. States could require municipalities and 
 
 37. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 38. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.  
 39. See PRIYA M. ABRAHAM, OPENING THE CURTAIN ON GOVERNMENT UNIONS  
5–8 (2015), http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/docLib/20150609_CBTransparency.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H9Z5-7PHM] (providing links to various state statutes that limit public 
participation and transparency in collective bargaining negotiations).  
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police unions to negotiate disciplinary procedures in public hearings 
rather than behind closed doors. Alternatively, states could require 
municipalities to establish notice-and-comment procedures, similar to 
those employed by administrative agencies, before agreeing to a 
package of disciplinary procedures via the collective bargaining 
process. Perhaps most radically, states could amend labor laws to 
remove police disciplinary procedures from the list of appropriate 
subjects for collective bargaining. This Article concludes by 
considering some of the benefits and drawbacks of these proposals. 
Ultimately, it seeks to reorient the scholarly discussion by fully 
recognizing how state labor law complicates police-reform efforts.  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the complex 
array of modern police labor and employment protections, including 
collective bargaining agreements, civil service statutes, and law 
enforcement officers’ bills of rights (LEOBRs). Part II explores the 
existing literature on collective bargaining agreements in police 
departments, and Part III describes the methodology used in this 
Article for coding the frequency of problematic disciplinary provisions 
in police union contracts. Part IV breaks down the content of collective 
bargaining agreements in some of the largest police departments in the 
United States. Finally, Part V makes some normative 
recommendations regarding how policymakers could increase 
transparency and public participation in the development of police 
disciplinary procedures.  
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I.  POLICE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS 
Numerous criminal law scholars have written on the merits of the 
exclusionary rule,40 civil litigation,41 criminal prosecution,42 and 
 
 40. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to 
wrongdoing by state and local police); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), (declining to 
extend the exclusionary rule to states), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643; Silverthorne Lumber 
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390–92 (1920) (expanding the exclusionary rule to cover not 
just illegally obtained material but also copies of illegally obtained material—the precursor to the 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (initially 
establishing the exclusionary rule, while limiting its application to federal law enforcement), 
overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. The purpose of the exclusionary rule, the prohibition on the use 
of evidence at trial which has been obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, is 
to deter police from committing such violations by eliminating any benefit that would be achieved. 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).  
Scholars have split on whether the exclusionary rule contributes to meaningful change in 
police departments. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 311, 355 (1991) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule has a meaningful impact on 
the likelihood that a police department would adopt reforms); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, 
The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1987) (finding that the CPD did respond “to deter—to compel respect 
for the constitutional guarantee in the only effective way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it”). But cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 322 (2d ed. 2008) (rejecting the influence of courts in bringing about social change 
through mechanisms like the exclusionary rule).  
 41. Victims of police misconduct can file civil suits in federal court against police officers, 
and in some cases police departments or municipalities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978) (establishing that a claimant is permitted to 
recover civil penalties from a department based on the unconstitutional actions of an officer 
employed by that department under § 1983). Research suggests that § 1983 may have influenced 
the availability of insurance for police departments, contributing to policy change. CHARLES R. 
EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE 
LEGALISTIC STATE 95 (2009). Nevertheless, some scholars worry that the organization of 
municipal government and indemnification policies limit the impact of civil litigation on police 
reform. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (showing 
that indemnification policies are prevalent across American police departments); Samuel Walker 
& Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or 
Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 495 (2009) (discussing how the organization 
of municipal governments lessens the impact of any individual civil settlement on police 
departments). 
 42. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on 
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 842 n.138 (1999) (“[C]riminal law standards define 
‘the outer limits of what is permissible in society’—not the good police practices that police 
reformers aspire to institute in a wayward department.” (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE 
KNIFE 101 (1995))).  
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structural reform litigation43 as tools for police reform.44 Only recently, 
however, have legal scholars begun to discuss the incidental impact of 
labor and employment law on police behavior.45  
This Part evaluates labor and employment laws that affect internal 
investigations and disciplinary action in American police departments, 
while the latter portions of this Article focus on the content of union 
contracts negotiated pursuant to state collective bargaining statutes.46 
In the overwhelming majority of states, collective bargaining statutes 
give police unions the power to negotiate salaries, benefits, and other 
conditions of employment for frontline police officers.47 Courts have 
 
 43. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1417 (2000) (offering a 
creative way that the DOJ could deputize private citizens to expand 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
enforcement). See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive 
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (suggesting a worst-first approach to enforcing 
§ 14141); Livingston, supra note 42, at 820. (“Section 14141 represents an important new remedial 
tool that offers enhanced opportunities for the radical reform of lax police administrative 
practices.”); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 
(2014) [hereinafter Rushin, Federal Enforcement] (discussing the federal government’s 
enforcement of § 14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police 
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015) (providing an empirical assessment of the use of  
§ 14141, a statute that gives the U.S. attorney general the authority to seek equitable relief against 
police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct); Kami Chavis 
Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of 
Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2008) (making an 
argument for more collaboration in § 14141 interventions).  
 44. Others have written about how private insurers regulate public law enforcement 
agencies. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). Still others have discussed how decertifying problematic officers could help 
address misconduct. See generally Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer 
Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 546 (2001) 
(“Without a mechanism at the state or national level to remove the certificate of law enforcement 
officials who engage in such misconduct, it is likely that there will be more such instances of 
repeated misconduct.”).  
 45. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012) 
(suggesting that labor and employment protections may act as a “tax” on police reform); Seth W. 
Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205–17 (2014) 
(discussing in broad terms the effect of labor laws and collective bargaining on policing).  
 46. See infra Part IV.  
 47. See infra Part I.A. This Article focuses primarily on disciplinary terms found in union 
contracts that dictate the working conditions for frontline police officers. Police departments 
generally rely on top-down command structures with a police commissioner or chief (or chiefs) at 
the top who are responsible for official policymaking. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song 
Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 9) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal); see also Peter K. Manning, A Dialectic of Organisational and 
Occupational Culture, in POLICE OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE: NEW DEBATES AND DIRECTIONS 
49, 70 (Megan O’Neill, Monique Marks & Anne-Marie Singh eds., 2007) (explaining that the top 
command in a police department is typically “composed of officers above the rank of 
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generally interpreted collective bargaining statutes to permit police 
unions to negotiate the methods that management may use to 
investigate and punish officers suspected of misconduct.48  
It is worth noting, though, that collective bargaining statutes 
represent just one part of a larger web of police labor and employment 
laws. Several other labor and employment laws also dictate the 
disciplinary standards for frontline police officers, including LEOBRs49 
and civil service statutes.50 This Part discusses each in turn.  
A. Collective Bargaining 
Police officers are a relatively new addition to the labor 
movement.51 The public initially viewed police unions with some 
suspicion—in part because of the “disastrous Boston Police 
Department strike of 1919, in which over a thousand officers—about 
two-thirds of Boston’s police force at the time—made a bid for higher 
pay and better hours by walking off the job or refusing to report for 
duty,” resulting in riots, numerous fatalities, and significant property 
damage.52 Around the time of the strike in Boston, officers faced 
deplorable working conditions. Although Boston had voted to give 
police officers a raise in 1898, it was not put into effect until 1913.53 
Even then, officers still earned meager wages for long hours. In the 
years leading up to the strike, experienced Boston police officers 
typically earned around $1200 a year and no officer could earn more 
than $1400 a year, even though officers had to buy their own uniforms 
 
superintendent (or commander) including chief, and deputy chief or assistant chief”). The 
significant “bulk of the department consists of the rank and file, who sit at the bottom of the 
organization.” Fisk & Richardson, supra (manuscript at 9). 
 48. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (manuscript at 25). 
 49. See infra Part I.C. 
 50. See infra Part I.B.  
 51. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2206. 
 52. Id. For more information on the 1919 strike of the Boston Police Department, see 
generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, 
AND THE STATE: 1900–1962 (2004). As Slater chronicles, in September of 1919, “practically all of 
Boston’s police officers went on strike,” concerned primarily with their wages, hours, and working 
conditions. Crowds of thousands of people then went on “a looting spree.” A group of rioters 
chanted “[k]ill them all” at a group of reserve park police. State guards were eventually brought 
in to quell the riot, resulting in officers firing “point-blank into the crowds, killing 9 and wounding 
23 others.” Id. at 13–14. When peace was ultimately restored, all 1147 striking officers were fired. 
This event would become infamous. Court opinions, labor opponents, and policymakers 
frequently cited the Boston strike “as a cautionary tale of the evils of such [police] unions.” Id.  
 53. See id. at 25.  
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at a cost of $200.54 Day-shift officers typically worked seventy-three 
hours a week, while night-shift officers worked around eighty-three 
hours a week; some officers were even forced to work as many as 
ninety-eight hours a week.55  
So, faced with few options for increasing their pay or improving 
their working conditions, a majority of Boston’s police force went on 
strike. Rather than helping Boston police, the strike of 1919 led to the 
firing of all 1147 officers and was met with widespread public 
condemnation.56 It would be decades after the Boston riots before 
states finally permitted police officers to unionize.57  
Today, though, the tables have turned. A majority of American 
states now permit or require municipalities to bargain collectively with 
police unions.58 According to the best estimates, around two-thirds of 
American police officers are part of a labor union.59 Police unions 
generally benefit from broad, bipartisan support—even from 
conservative politicians who have fought against unionization for other 
government employees.60  
Unionization has had some major and undeniable benefits for 
frontline officers. The average starting salary for sworn officers in 
 
 54. See id.  
 55. Id. (explaining that some officers were forced to work seventeen-hour days and that 
supervisors were limited in their travel or movement on days off).  
 56. Id. at 14.  
 57. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (manuscript at 21) (stating that “[u]nions finally 
succeeded in gaining a lasting foothold in American police departments in the late 1960s”).  
 58. According to a recent study, four states—Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia—generally prohibit police departments from collectively bargaining. Five states—
Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, and Wyoming—have no clear statute or case law that 
has settled whether police officers may collectively bargain. The remaining forty-one states 
appear to have statutes that generally require or permit local police departments to bargain 
collectively with police unions about salaries, benefits, and other terms of employment. MILLA 
SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RES., REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 7 (2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-
2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YSB-YALN]. 
 59. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007,  
at 13 (rev. ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM4U-55UH] 
(showing that around 66 percent of officers are employed by departments that engage in collective 
bargaining).  
 60. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2207 (“Times have changed, and today police unions enjoy 
broad legal and social support.”); A.J. Delgado, It’s Time for Conservatives to Stop Defending 
Police, NAT’L REV. (July 21, 2014, 6:10 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/383312/ 
its-time-conservatives-stop-defending-police-j-delgado [https://perma.cc/PLS2-TWVH] (arguing 
that conservatives too often defend police unions while trying to fight against unionization in 
other contexts, like public schools).  
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police departments with collective bargaining is around 38 percent 
higher than in police departments without it.61 Unionization has also 
allowed frontline officers to have a greater say in internal policy 
matters. The typical police union contract now governs “a broad range 
of topics in excruciating detail.”62  
State statutes regulating these collective bargaining agreements 
typically define their scope broadly, permitting public employees to 
negotiate on any “matters of wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment.”63 Courts have generally understood terms like “wages” 
to permit public employees to bargain about anything that directly or 
indirectly affects their compensation, including direct wages or salaries, 
fringe benefits, health insurance, life insurance, retirement benefits, 
sick leave, vacation time, and any indirect form of compensation.64  
Phrases like “conditions of employment” are trickier to interpret. 
If read broadly, this sort of language can become a “catchall phrase 
 
 61. REAVES, supra note 59, at 13 (noting that the average salary for entry-level officers was 
approximately $10,887 higher in departments with collective bargaining—$39,263 in agencies with 
collective bargaining, compared to $28,376 in agencies without it—and that this discrepancy 
existed in all population categories).  
 62. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2208 (using as examples of the intricate nature of modern 
collective bargaining agreements the CPD contract, which is 150 pages long, the Boston Police 
Department contract, which is sixty-three pages long, and the New York Police Department 
contract, which is twenty-eight pages long). It is also worth mentioning that municipalities 
frequently must negotiate with multiple police unions that represent different segments of the 
police department. Id. at 2207–08. As an example, Stoughton explains that the City of Dallas must 
negotiate with both the “chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police and the Dallas Police 
Association.” Id. at 2208. Likewise, the City of New York must negotiate with five different 
unions. Id. And in Los Angeles, the city must bargain with eight different unions. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.040.070 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-271 (West 
2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1301 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309 (West 2013); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-9 (LexisNexis 2014); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/2 (West 2013); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 36-8-22-3 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 67A.6902 (West 2016); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 6 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 423.215(1) (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.06-5 (West 2016); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 105.520 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-305(2) (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-816 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.150(2) (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:1 (LexisNexis 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 2011); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17(A)(1) (2013; N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204(2) (McKinney 2011); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 51-101 (West 2012; OR. REV. 
STAT. § 243.650(7)(a) (2015); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West 2009); 28 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-4 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-3 (2013; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.  
§ 174.002 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20a-3 (LexisNexis 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,  
§ 1725 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.030 (West 2016).  
 64. See generally Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State 
Public Employment Relations, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3, at 242 (1978 & Supp. 2015) (analyzing 
permissible public-employee bargaining for direct and indirect compensation). 
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into which almost any proposal may fall.”65 To limit the scope of 
collective bargaining statutes, courts and state labor relations boards 
have generally held that managerial prerogatives should not be subject 
to negotiation as so-called “conditions of employment.”66  
In practice, though, courts have proved fairly deferential to public-
employee unions. Only a handful of courts have examined whether 
disciplinary procedures in police departments are considered 
“conditions of employment,” thereby making them subject to 
collective bargaining. A number of these courts have held that police 
disciplinary procedure is an appropriate subject of collective 
bargaining.67 Some courts, though, have carved out exceptions for 
specific disciplinary topics.68  
In sum, political leaders on both sides of the aisle who once 
rejected police unionization as a threat to public safety have now 
widely embraced it. Collective bargaining has emerged as a major 
 
 65. Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex. 
App. 1999). 
 66. Tussey, supra note 64, at 242–43. As the American Law Reports has explained: 
  Perhaps the single greatest . . . limitation on the scope of bargaining or negotiation 
by . . . public employees is the concept of managerial prerogative as it has developed in 
the public sector. In essence, the concept creates a dichotomy between “bargainable” 
issues, that is, those issues which affect conditions of employment, and issues of 
“policy” which are exclusively reserved to government discretion and cannot be made 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
Id. at 255–56. 
 67. See, e.g., City of Casselberry v. Orange Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 482 So. 2d 336, 340 
(Fla. 1986) (holding that even though the state civil service law established some procedures for 
demotion and discharge, municipalities were still required to bargain collectively on those issues 
to the extent necessary to potentially establish alternate grievance procedures); City of Reno v. 
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 653 P.2d 156, 158 (Nev. 1982) (holding that Nevada law requires 
municipalities to negotiate with police departments over disciplinary measures); Union Twp. Bd. 
of Trs. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No. 112, 766 N.E.2d 1027, 1031–32 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that discipline was a mandatory subject of bargaining, so that when the 
township refused to bargain, a conciliator could select the union’s proposal on discipline in its 
final settlement award). 
 68. See, e.g., Berkeley Police Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 143 Cal. Rptr. 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1977) (affirming the lower court’s judgment and order declining to enjoin the city police 
department’s practice of permitting members of the citizens’ police review commission to meet 
and confer with the police union when new civil oversight mechanisms were being implemented); 
Local 346, Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 462 N.E.2d 96, 102 (Mass. 
1984) (holding that a police department has an overriding interest in the integrity of its officers, 
which exempts it from having to negotiate over the use of polygraph examinations when 
investigating criminal activity by police officers); State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n, 634 
A.2d 478, 493 (N.J. 1993) (limiting mandatory subjects of collective bargaining for police in 
disciplinary cases because of the uniqueness of police work).  
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avenue through which labor unions shape the internal policies and 
practices of American police departments. 
B. Civil Service Protections 
A parallel source of employment regulations in American police 
departments is state civil service law.69 A large majority of American 
states have civil service laws on the books that regulate the 
appointment and discharge of public employees, including police 
officers.70 Over time, the scope of civil service protections has 
expanded to regulate a wide range of employment actions, including 
“demotions, transfers, layoffs and recalls, discharges, training, salary 
administration, attendance control, safety, grievances, pay and benefit 
determination, and classification of positions.”71 
The driving force behind civil service laws is a desire to establish a 
merit system in public employment72—a far cry from much of 
American history, when government jobs were allocated on the basis 
of political patronage.73 Historians trace the origins of modern civil 
service laws to the assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 by 
a “disappointed office seeker,” which ultimately contributed to the 
passage of the Civil Service Act, or Pendleton Act, in 1883.74 Since 
then, civil service statutes have slowly spread across the United States. 
By 1970, one survey estimated that some sort of civil service statute 
 
 69. It appears that a strong majority of states have civil service statutes that apply to 
municipal police officers. For some representative examples of these state civil service laws, see 
ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-180 to 190 (2008) (establishing a civil service system for municipal law 
enforcement); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1001 to 1007 (1956) (establishing a civil service system for 
law enforcement officers); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-51-301 to 311 (2013 & Supp. 2015) 
(establishing a civil service system for firefighters and police officers); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-
30-101 to 107 (2016) (establishing a civil service system for municipal police officers); D.C. CODE 
§§ 5-101.01–5.133-21, 5-1302 to 1305 (2001 & Supp. 2016) (establishing a civil service system for 
police); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 143.001–143.403 (2008 & Supp. 2016) (establishing a civil 
service system for municipal police and fire department personnel). A handful of states do not 
appear to have civil service protections for police officers, including Georgia, Maryland, Montana, 
New Hampshire, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  
 70. Ann C. Hodges, The Interplay of Civil Service Law and Collective Bargaining Law in 
Public Sector Employee Discipline Cases, 32 B.C. L. REV. 95, 103 (1990). 
 71. Id. at 102. 
 72. Id. (stating that a driving purpose behind civil service laws was to ensure the “selection, 
promotion, and retention of government employees on the basis of merit”). 
 73. R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 1–3 (1976). 
 74. Id.  
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protected around 80 percent of all state and local government 
employees.75  
As Professor Rachel Harmon has observed, civil service laws 
empower frontline police officers “to challenge any internal 
managerial action that affects them on both substantive and procedural 
grounds in a formal adversarial process,” which ultimately leads to 
“costly legal battles” when “police departments demote, transfer, or 
fire any officer.”76 This arguably makes civil service laws “an especially 
efficient disincentive” to police reform.77 States are split about whether 
collective bargaining agreements can supersede civil service laws and 
establish more protective procedures for hiring, promotion, 
disciplinary action, and grievance procedures.78 Thus, in many states, 
civil service laws establish a floor for police officer employment 
protections, which police unions can raise through collective 
bargaining.  
C. Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights 
In addition to collective bargaining and civil service statutes, a 
handful of states have passed yet another layer of employment 
protections for frontline police officers: LEOBRs.79 Unlike civil service 
laws, which protect a wide range of public employees, LEOBRs 
provide police officers with due process protections during disciplinary 
 
 75. Hodges, supra note 70, at 101 n.32. 
 76. Harmon, supra note 45, at 796.  
 77. Id. at 797. 
 78. Hodges, supra note 70, at 107–09 (describing how states have taken three different 
approaches in interpreting the tension between civil service laws and collective bargaining 
agreements, and walking through the possible strengths and weaknesses of each approach). 
 79. Craig Whitlock, Power Urged for Police Panel, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2000, at B1. See, 
e.g., Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis 
of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 185 (2005). 
(using the term “Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights,” as have numerous major media 
outlets); Paul Butler, The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights Creates a Double Standard, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2015, 9:13 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/29/baltimore- 
and-bolstering-a-police-officers-right-to-remain-silent/the-police-officers-bill-of-rights-creates-a-
double-standard [https://perma.cc/8H86-Z879] (using the “Law Enforcement Officers Bill of 
Rights” as a term); Adam May, Maryland Police Lawyer: Officers’ Bill of Rights Is Not Wrong, 
AL JAZEERA AM. (May 3, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-
tonight/articles/2015/5/3/maryland-police-lawyer-officers-bill-of-rights-is-not-wrong.html [https://
perma.cc/EA2R-34BD] (same). 
For another helpful analysis of LEOBRs, which describes their proliferation and ultimately 
argues that these laws could serve as a useful way to reform civilian interrogations, see generally 
Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (2016). 
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investigations that are not given to other classes of public employees. 
LEOBRs themselves came about in part because of the Supreme 
Court’s 1967 decision in Garrity v. New Jersey,80 which prevented states 
from using compelled statements made by police officers during 
disciplinary investigations in future criminal proceedings.81 Modern 
LEOBR protections, though, go well beyond limitations on officer 
interrogations. 
An example from Prince George’s County, Maryland, 
demonstrates the power of these LEOBRs. In 2000, the DOJ initiated 
an investigation of the Prince George’s County Police Department 
after an unusual pattern of fatal shootings and allegations of excessive 
use of force.82 In response, community activists proposed the creation 
of a civilian review board tasked with investigating citizen complaints 
against law enforcement officers.83  
But the activists faced a major obstacle: the state of Maryland is 
one of at least sixteen states that have LEOBRs. Like other states with 
LEOBRs, Maryland provides additional protections to police officers 
facing internal disciplinary investigations.84 The Maryland LEOBR 
specifically prevents civilians from investigating police officers, 
effectively preventing meaningful community oversight of local 
officers.85 The Maryland LEOBR also prevents localities from 
 
 80. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
 81. Levine, supra note 79, at 1220–21; see also Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 (holding that the 
“protection . . . against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of 
statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they 
are policemen or other members of our body politic”). See generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled 
Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2001) (providing 
a review of the Garrity doctrine and the use of compelled testimony from police officers during 
trial).  
 82. For more information about the circumstances that spurred federal involvement, see 
Craig Whitlock & Jamie Stockwell, U.S. to Probe Pr. George’s Police Force, WASH. POST, Nov. 
2, 2000, at A1. The DOJ’s investigation of the Prince George’s County Police Department 
officially began on July 1, 1999. The DOJ reached a settlement with the police department on 
January 22, 2004. See Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 43, at 3244–47 (showing these 
dates in Appendices A & B). The DOJ’s involvement in the Prince George’s County 
investigations ended in early 2009. Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (showing these closing dates in Appendices A & B).  
 83. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 189 .  
 84. Id. at 185 (describing how LEOBRs have added a “special layer of employee due process 
protections when [officers face] investigations for official misconduct”). 
 85. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(b) (West 2015) (stating that the investigating 
officer for any investigation of a Maryland police officer should be a “sworn law enforcement 
officer” unless a different party is specifically designated by the Governor, Attorney General, or 
Attorney General’s designee).  
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punishing officers for “brutality” unless a complaint is filed within 
ninety days of the alleged incident.86 It strictly limits officer 
interrogation procedures.87 And it allows police officers to remove 
civilian complaints from their personnel files after three years.88 Across 
the country, virtually “[n]o other group of public employees enjoys 
equivalent” legislative protection during disciplinary proceedings.89 
Predictably, civil rights advocates have argued that the Maryland 
LEOBR “is a major obstacle to those locales that wish to establish a 
system of civilian review” and other types of disciplinary procedures.90  
Some states have LEOBR provisions that are even more 
protective of police officers than Maryland’s. For example, Delaware 
bars municipalities from requiring police officers to disclose their 
personal assets.91 Such a directive is likely an attempt to protect 
Delaware officers from the kind of anticorruption measures that the 
DOJ required the Los Angeles Police Department to implement as 
part of a federal consent decree.92 California is among several states 
that bar the use of polygraphs when interrogating police officers.93 
Illinois requires all citizen complaints to be accompanied by a sworn 
affidavit, essentially preventing citizens from filing anonymous 
complaints.94  
 
 86. Id. § 3-104(c)(2) (“Unless a complaint is filed within 90 days after the alleged brutality, 
an investigation that may lead to disciplinary action under this subtitle for brutality may not be 
initiated and an action may not be taken.”).  
 87. Id. § 3-104(d)–(k) (providing limits on the time, methods, place, and conduct of 
interrogations of police officers).  
 88. Id. § 3-110 (providing that police officers may have their complaints in personnel files 
deleted after three years and setting forth procedures for the removal of complaints that are not 
sustained after an investigation).  
 89. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 186.  
 90. Testimony for the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee: Senate Bill 655: Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights Act 2002: Support with Amendments, 2000 Leg., 416th Sess. 
2 (Md. 2002) (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of the National 
Capital Area).  
 91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9202 (2015) (“No officer shall be required or requested to 
disclose any item of personal property, income, assets, sources of income, debts, personal or 
domestic expenditures . . . .”).  
 92. Randal C. Archibold, Los Angeles Police Told to Disclose Their Finances, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2007, at A28 (explaining how, as part of a federal consent decree under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 
the LAPD had to require “an array of personal financial” disclosures to fight corruption in the 
department’s gang and narcotics divisions; this measure faced fierce opposition from police union 
leaders who argued that it would lead to a “mass exodus from the units”).  
 93. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3307(a) (West 2015) (“No public safety officer shall be compelled 
to submit to a lie detector test against his or her will.”).  
 94. 85 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/3.8(b) (West 2011). 
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Police officers have secured such extensive protections by arguing 
that special disciplinary procedures are necessary, as police “must be 
granted the widest latitude to exercise their discretion in handling 
difficult and often dangerous situations, and should not be second-
guessed if a decision appears in retrospect to have been incorrect.”95 
Critics have argued that LEOBRs represent an attempt by police 
officers to take advantage of their “knowledge of how the criminal 
justice system works . . . [to] shield themselves from its operation[].”96 
But Professor Kate Levine has suggested that the interrogation 
limitations included in some LEOBRs are “more in line with our 
current notions of humane treatment of those who are suspected of 
violating the criminal law.”97 Thus, she imagines how policymakers 
could use these highly protective LEOBRs as a starting point for 
“reinvigorat[ing] the debate over how to protect criminal suspects” 
during interrogations.98  
The approximately sixteen states that have passed generally 
applicable LEOBRs employ roughly 37.4 percent of all municipal 
police officers in the United States.99 That number may rise in the near 
future. Eleven other states have recently considered passing their own 
LEOBRs.100 And Congress has periodically considered the passage of 
a national LEOBR, although such proposals have yet to gain 
significant traction.101 Appendix C breaks down some of the most 
 
 95. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 186.  
 96. Levine, supra note 79, at 1211–12.  
 97. Id. at 1212. 
 98. Id.  
 99. The sixteen states that have generally applicable LEOBRs are Arizona, California, 
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Eli Hager, Blue Shield: Did You 
Know Police Have Their Own Bill of Rights?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 27, 2015,  
12:06 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield [https://perma.cc/KH8F-
MEP7] (identifying all of these statutes, except Iowa’s); see IOWA CODE § 80F.1 (2007) 
(establishing Iowa’s so-called “Peace Officer, Public Safety, and Emergency Personnel Bill of 
Rights”). These sixteen states have approximately 238,028 of the nation’s 635,781 law 
enforcement officers, or around 37.4 percent. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES: FULL-TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-
the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-77 [https://perma.cc/5RDS-W4NZ] (showing the 
number of police officers employed in each state). Texas has passed a LEOBR that only applies 
to cities with a population of over 1.5 million citizens. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.123 
(West 1987). This means that this state law only applies to one city—Houston. Other states have 
more generally applicable state LEOBRs. 
 100. Hager, supra note 99. 
 101. Id.  
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highly protective and potentially problematic provisions in state 
LEOBRs.  
D. Other Police Protections 
In addition to collective bargaining statutes, civil service statutes, 
and LEOBRs, a number of states have passed or recently considered 
additional employment protections designed to shield police officers 
from harassment or privacy violations. Events in Philadelphia 
demonstrate the growing demand for additional labor and employment 
protections for frontline police officers. When then-Philadelphia Police 
Commissioner Charles Ramsey attempted to pass an internal 
regulation that would have provided for the release of the names of 
officers involved in civilian shootings, the Fraternal Order of Police 
filed an unfair labor practices charge, alleging that Chief Ramsey had 
not properly negotiated with the union over this policy change.102 The 
union then lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature for a bill that would 
protect the identities of police involved in civilian shootings.103  
Pennsylvania is one of several states that have considered such 
bills over the last several years.104 For example, a substantial number of 
states have enacted legislative limitations on open records laws to 
prevent the public from accessing officers’ personnel and disciplinary 
files.105 And a number of states and localities have acted to prevent the 
 
 102. John Sullivan et al., In Fatal Shootings by Police, 1 in 5 Officers’ Names Go Undisclosed, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/in-fatal-shootings-
by-police-1-in-5-officers-names-go-undisclosed/2016/03/31/4bb08bc8-ea10-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a
7b7_story.html [https://perma.cc/7L2T-CUPL]. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. (stating that “[i]n Oregon, lawmakers in the state House in February passed a bill that 
would have allowed police departments to withhold for 90 days the names of officers who have 
received threats,” and in Phoenix, “police unions objected when the department there released 
the name of the officer who fatally shot” a civilian). 
 105. See Robert Lewis, Noah Veltman & Xander Landen, Is Police Misconduct a Secret in 
Your State?, WNYC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.wnyc.org/story/police-misconduct-records 
[https://perma.cc/UBM8-KNC6] (“In these states, police disciplinary records are generally 
available to the public. Many of these states still make records of unsubstantiated complaints or 
active investigations confidential.”); see also Jim Miller, California Has Tightest Restrictions on 
Law Enforcement Records, Access Advocates Say, MODESTO BEE (Mar. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.modbee.com/news/state/article3162015.html [https://perma.cc/Y68F-5LV5] (“[O]pen 
records advocates say California residents today have some of the least access to law enforcement 
records of anywhere in the country.”). It is also worth noting that when the California measure 
was passed in 1978, Governor Jerry Brown hailed it as a “substantial step forward in protecting 
the rights of law enforcement officers,” and it received strong support. Id. 
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public from accessing police body-camera footage without a court 
order.106  
II.  EXISTING RESEARCH 
Police union contracts, civil service laws, and LEOBRs provide 
police officers with an array of legal protections in cases of internal 
disciplinary investigations. While each of these mechanisms could 
theoretically insulate officers from accountability and oversight, this 
Article focuses specifically on the content of disciplinary procedures in 
police union contracts. More specifically, it evaluates how modern 
police union contracts limit disciplinary investigation and oversight of 
frontline police officers. The existing literature contains little 
discussion of the disciplinary procedures that police unions have 
obtained through collective bargaining. This is in part because there 
are thousands of decentralized police departments in the United 
States, and each negotiates its own collective bargaining agreements, 
largely outside public view.107  
Only a few legal scholars have discussed the relationship between 
police union contracts and internal disciplinary action. Professor Seth 
Stoughton hypothesizes that grievance procedures found in collective 
bargaining agreements may “both discourage and frustrate attempts to 
discipline officers.”108 Harmon observes that collective bargaining 
 
 106. See, e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, North Carolina Law Blocks Release of Police Recordings, 
CNN (July 13, 2016, 11:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/politics/north-carolina-police-
recording-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/W4XZ-Y5TU] (“North Carolina . . . [passed] 
legislation this week that blocks the release of law enforcement recordings from body cameras or 
dashboard cameras with limited exceptions.”); Peter Hermann & Aaron C. Davis, As Police  
Body Cameras Catch On, a Debate Surfaces: Who Gets to Watch?, WASH. POST  
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/as-police-body-cameras-catch-on-
a-debate-surfaces-who-gets-to-watch/2015/04/17/c4ef64f8-e360-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.
html [https://perma.cc/5MNR-X3RY] (explaining that “[o]fficials in more than a dozen states—
as well as the District [of Columbia]—have proposed restricting access or completely withholding 
the footage from the public, citing concerns over privacy and the time and cost of blurring images 
that identify victims, witnesses or bystanders caught in front of the lens”). 
 107. BRIAN A. REAVES, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 
2008, at 2 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. 233982, 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7YL-LQA2] (putting the number of state and local law 
enforcement agencies at 17,985).  
 108. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2211. Professor Seth Stoughton also theorizes that collective 
bargaining might create or aggravate “intradepartmental tensions.” Id. at 2214. One other 
fascinating consequence of collective bargaining in police departments, as hypothesized by 
Stoughton, is the increasingly long and complex “petty military and bureaucratic regulations” that 
codify acceptable and unacceptable behavior in “shockingly great and verbose detail.” Id. at 2213. 
For example, Stoughton cites the more than 1600 pages of manuals which New York City police 
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rights might “deter department-wide changes intended to prevent 
constitutional violations.”109 Professor Samuel Walker wrote on the 
relationship between collective bargaining and disciplinary 
procedures, pointing out that provisions in police union contracts like 
Baltimore’s prevent supervisors from responding forcefully to officer 
wrongdoing.110 Professors Catherine Fisk and L. Song Richardson have 
written an important and detailed account of how unions can both 
impede and promote reform in police departments.111 Fisk and 
Richardson ultimately argue that states should permit a limited form 
of minority union bargaining—that is, bargaining by a minority of the 
employees in a bargaining unit—in hopes of empowering officer 
groups supportive of reform in their efforts to influence policing 
practices.112 
Combined, the existing legal literature provides some evidence for 
the hypothesis that collective bargaining can impede police 
accountability efforts. But this literature is largely theoretical rather 
than empirical.113 Two existing studies outside of legal academia have 
shed some light on the content of police union contracts. First, 
Professors David Carter and Allen Sapp completed one of the only 
other empirical studies on the content of police union contracts in 
1992.114 In their analysis, though, Carter and Sapp did not focus 
specifically on language within these contracts dealing with disciplinary 
procedures. Instead, they provided a descriptive analysis of the 
common topics of negotiation in union contracts. Additionally, 
 
must master. Even smaller cities like Madison have policy manuals around four hundred pages in 
length. Id. 
 109. Harmon, supra note 45, at 799.  
 110. WALKER, supra note 22, at 2.  
 111. See generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (providing in a forthcoming paper a 
historical account of how unions may both impede and facilitate reform in police departments).  
 112. Id. (manuscript at 65) (“We would allow officers to belong both to the minority union 
and to the majority union so that they would not have to give up the benefits of majority union 
membership . . . but also could gain the benefits of membership in the minority union 
[like] . . . (the ability to have a voice in the minority union’s governance and priority-setting 
policies).”).  
 113. One previous empirical study has examined how labor protections in the CPD’s union 
contract in the early 1990s may have resulted in a reduction in disciplinary action against police 
officers. Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 216 (1998) (citing how mandatory arbitration resulted in disciplinary action 
essentially being cut in half for many officers in Chicago). 
 114. David L. Carter & Allen D. Sapp, A Comparative Analysis of Clauses in Police Collective 
Bargaining Agreements as Indicators of Change in Labor Relations, 12 AM. J. POLICE 17, 17 
(1992).  
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because they completed their study over two decades ago, Carter and 
Sapp’s work may no longer reflect the state of police union contracts 
today.115  
Second, community activists, in part associated with groups like 
Black Lives Matter, have organized grassroots efforts to collect and 
consider the merits of police union contracts from around eighty large 
cities.116 While this work has shed some important light on potentially 
troubling patterns in police union contracts, it by no means forecloses 
the need for additional research.  
As discussed more in Part IV, this Article improves on the 
methodology used in these previous studies of police union contracts 
in several ways. It relies on a substantially larger collection of police 
union contracts than the recent work done by community activists. It 
also considers different categories of disciplinary procedures when 
analyzing police union contracts. In addition, it explicitly evaluates the 
legal issues surrounding police unionization and offers normative 
recommendations. In sum, the existing literature—particularly the 
existing literature within legal academia—lacks a comprehensive study 
of the content of police union contracts.  
This gap in the literature is increasingly problematic for two 
reasons. First, at least theoretically, the conditions under which most 
municipalities negotiate police union contracts are susceptible to 
regulatory capture.117 Negotiations typically happen outside of the 
public view.118 Police unions are also a powerful political 
 
 115. Id. at 17–18 (explaining that their article was intended to provide a descriptive analysis 
of the common topics of negotiation in union contracts, as specifically requested by those in the 
field).  
 116. The website Check the Police, which is associated with the Black Lives Matter movement, 
has been collecting police union contracts contemporaneously with the writing of this article. 
CHECK THE POLICE, http://www.checkthepolice.org [https://perma.cc/SQX2-6BGS]. 
 117. Regulatory capture describes a form of government failure in which a regulatory entity 
responsible for protecting the public interest instead advances the interests of the entity it was 
tasked with regulating. For further explanation, see generally Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory 
Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006). For a recent example of alleged 
regulatory capture, see Regulatory Capture 101: Impressionable Journalists Finally Meet George 
Stigler, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 6, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulatory-capture-
101-1412544509 [https://perma.cc/ZU35-3XC6] (describing the regulatory capture that occurred 
when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York relaxed its oversight of Goldman Sachs).  
 118. Only eight states require public hearings for police union negotiations and only four 
states require that municipalities make these agreements public before ratification. See 
ABRAHAM, supra note 39, at 5–8 (providing links to various state statutes). 
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constituency.119 For this reason, municipal leaders may be strongly 
incentivized to offer concessions to police unions on disciplinary 
procedures in exchange for lower officer salaries.120 Because municipal 
expenditures can dominate local headlines, the result is a sort of moral 
hazard.121 Municipal leaders may be incentivized to offer concessions 
on police disciplinary procedures because they are less likely to bear 
the costs of those concessions in the immediate future. After all, the 
typical victim of police misconduct is often a member of a relatively 
small and politically disadvantaged minority of municipal voters.122 
Thus, it seems theoretically plausible that police unions may be able to 
obtain unreasonably favorable disciplinary procedures through 
collective bargaining—perhaps beyond those that exist in civil service 
statutes or LEOBRs.  
Second, this gap in the literature is problematic in an age in which 
police accountability has dominated headlines. In a handful of 
individual cases, the media and community groups have uncovered 
provisions in police union contracts that appear to limit officer 
 
 119. Delgado, supra note 60 (arguing that conservatives have helped police unions become 
too politically powerful); Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2207 (describing the wide political and 
social support for police unions).  
 For some examples of the modern power of police unions in shaping political decisions 
and the national dialogue, see Lee Fang, Maryland Cop Lobbyists Helped Block Reforms Just 
Last Month, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:42 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/04/28/
balltimore-freddie-gray-prosecute [https://perma.cc/L2YV-222A] (describing police unions as a 
“major force in state politics” in Maryland, which have been able to block legislation they view as 
unfavorable to police officers); David Firestone, The Rise of New York’s Police Unions, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:46 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/new-
york-police-unions-powerful [https://perma.cc/FP5N-YE5P] (describing how New York’s police 
unions have “flexed their muscles to help their members” and even “orchestrat[ed] a politically 
motivated slowdown in arrests and ticket-writing” to protest new regulation); Conor Friedersdorf, 
How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Streets, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-keep-abusive-cops-on-
the-street/383258 [https://perma.cc/XZ5N-E96N] (walking through how police unions have 
developed enough power that they can effectively prevent discipline against officers); Michael 
Tracey, The Pernicious Power of the Police Lobby, VICE (Dec. 4, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.vice.
com/read/the-pernicious-power-of-police-unions [https://perma.cc/A6SM-DYNL] (describing 
how powerful police unions have blocked meaningful reforms of police behavior).  
 120. See infra notes 273–77 and accompanying text.  
 121. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public 
Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 416 (2012) (“In general, moral hazard problems arise in 
the context of information asymmetry: one party (politicians) has more information and less 
concern about the consequences of their behavior than the party that must pay (taxpayers).”).  
 122. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 145–50 
(2016) [hereinafter Rushin, Using Data] (describing how those victimized by police misconduct 
are often marginalized and have little political power to fight back).  
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 
2017] POLICE UNION CONTRACTS 1217 
accountability.123 A hack of the Fraternal Order of Police’s server has 
revealed dozens of additional contracts—many of which appeared to 
contain unusually deferential disciplinary standards for officers.124 All 
of this suggests that the relationship between union contracts and 
police accountability is an issue of serious national concern warranting 
additional empirical examination. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
While the existing literature has shown the presence of 
problematic provisions in a handful of police union contracts, there is 
a need for a contemporary, empirical examination of the frequency of 
such provisions. To begin filling this gap in the existing literature, I 
collected and coded police union contracts from American cities with 
a population of over one hundred thousand residents.125 Public record 
 
 123. See, e.g., David C. Couper, To Address Shootings, Start by Diminishing the Power  
of the Unions, USA TODAY (July 7, 2016, 8:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/policing/spotlight/2016/07/07/address-shootings-start-diminishing-power-unions-column/
84944524 [https://perma.cc/KZ52-2W4C] (linking the lack of accountability in police departments 
to the power of police unions and collective bargaining); Ross Douthat, Our Police Union 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/ross-
douthat-our-police-union-problem.html [https://perma.cc/LKN8-TPZQ] (connecting the lack of 
accountability in police departments to unionization); Adeshina Emmanuel, State Law Protects 
Police Contract Provisions Blasted by Task Force, CHI. MAG. (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.
chicagomag.com/city-life/April-2016/State-Law-Protects-Police-Contract-Provisions-Blasted-by-
Task-Force [https://perma.cc/3TCN-QQ68] (discussing the link between union contracts and 
accountability).  
 124. See George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will 
Be Kept Secret, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-files-contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret 
[https://perma.cc/K5A9-BUKN] (describing the hack of the Fraternal Order of Police database 
and a follow-up study conducted by reporters at the Guardian who found that a substantial 
number of the sixty-seven contracts studied had some limitations on disciplinary action against 
officers accused of misconduct).  
 125. This study uses the 2010 U.S. Census to identify 252 cities with a population of at least 
one hundred thousand. This study added a handful of additional cities that appeared to have 
surpassed one hundred thousand residents in the years since the census. Annual Estimates of 
Resident Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More in 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(May 2016), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
PEP_2015_PEPANNCHIP>US12A&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/KT2W-5VFN]. Of these 
252 cities with over one hundred thousand residents, 223 are located in states favorable to police 
unionization. A substantial number of these 223 cities are located in states that permit, but do not 
require unionization of frontline police officers, like Texas. Thus, the actual number of cities with 
over one hundred thousand residents that actually collectively bargain with their police force 
appears to be lower than 223—likely closer to two hundred.  
 It is not uncommon for municipalities to negotiate separately with different labor unions 
that represent different segments of a police department. For example, Boston, Buffalo, 
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 
1218  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1191 
requests, examinations of municipal government websites, and online 
searches resulted in the collection of police union contracts from 178 
municipalities between 2014 and 2016.126 Appendix A provides a full 
list of all the municipalities included in this dataset.  
The contracts in this dataset govern the working conditions in 
police departments that employ around 170,625 municipal police 
officers.127 While police departments commonly negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements with a number of different unions,128 this 
Article focuses specifically on those agreements governing the working 
conditions of frontline police officers—a category distinct from 
contracts that govern police supervisors like sergeants, lieutenants, or 
captains. Approximately 411,682 officers work in states with laws that 
permit or require collective bargaining in police departments.129 Thus, 
 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, and New York are just a handful of cities in this sample that negotiate 
contracts with multiple police unions.  
 126. In a small number of cases, when I could not obtain the union contract directly from the 
municipality, I relied on the most recently available union contract I could find through the 
municipal or other state website. Even when I received the union contract directly from the 
municipality, some of these contracts may have lapsed between the time of collection and the time 
of publication. That is, the municipality and the local police union may have since agreed to a new 
contract, which has since replaced the contract analyzed in this Article. This is an unavoidable 
consequence of collecting so many contracts and the long publication process. Nevertheless, this 
potential limitation should have little effect on the overall analysis in this Article. For those 
contracts that recently lapsed, there is little reason to think that police union contracts have 
changed significantly in the last few years. The ultimate goal of this Article is not to examine the 
contents of any one particular union contract, but to instead provide some statistical sense about 
the frequency of problematic disciplinary provisions across the entire universe of police union 
contracts in large American cities. Before making any conclusions about the contents of a specific 
city’s police union contract, I strongly advise readers to check for the most up-to-date version of 
their targeted contract.  
 127. The total number of officers serving in each department included in this dataset can be 
found in Appendix A.  
 128. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2207 (“Large law enforcement agencies typically bargain 
with multiple unions.”).  
 129. I obtained this number by first estimating the number of municipal police officers in 
states that permit or require police unionization. There are an estimated 461,063 municipal police 
officers in the United States. This figure does not include officers that work at the federal level, 
state level, or for sheriff’s departments. It only includes officers who work for municipal police 
departments in incorporated cities. The states that are not favorable to police unionization 
employ 49,381 municipal police officers. Thus, the entire population of police officers in states 
that permit or require police unionization is 411,682.  
 It is important to recognize that the actual number of officers whose working conditions 
are governed by a union contract is likely substantially lower than 411,682, as many cities in states 
that permit unionization have chosen not to negotiate with police unions. However, using this 
conservative estimate, this study can safely claim to examine the union contracts that govern the 
working conditions of 170,625 municipal officers, or 41.4 percent of the population of municipal 
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the dataset in this study covers approximately 41.4 percent of municipal 
police officers in states that permit or require collective bargaining. 
While this dataset helps readers understand the content of police union 
contracts in many large American cities, it is not necessarily 
generalizable to all police departments, particularly those in smaller 
municipalities.130 This analysis is also focused specifically on 
disciplinary procedures. More research may be helpful in identifying 
other important trends in these contracts.  
Before coding my dataset to identify the frequency of problematic 
disciplinary provisions, I first developed a coding scheme. To do this, I 
conducted a preliminary examination of the dataset, surveyed the 
existing literature, and consulted media reports. Through this iterative 
process, I settled on a coding scheme that included seven recurring and 
potentially problematic disciplinary provisions. Figure 1 defines these 
seven common categories of problematic police union provisions.  
 
officers working in states that permit or require unionization. See REAVES, supra note 59, at 2, 
16. 
 130. A few words of caution about the generalizability of this study are in order. The sample 
used in this study is not necessarily representative of the entire population of unionized police 
departments in the United States. The sampling methodology used in this study focused 
specifically on the nation’s largest police departments. Since these agencies serve a larger cross-
section of the American population, this methodology allows this Article to get the biggest 
proverbial “bang for the buck.” But readers should be cautious when speaking about the 
generalizability of these findings. No doubt, this sample provides a detailed look at the content of 
police union contracts in large American cities. It remains unclear, however, whether union 
contracts in large municipalities differ in any systematic way from union contracts in smaller 
communities. 
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Figure 1: Coding Scheme 
Problematic Provision Definition 
Delays Interrogations of 
Officers Suspected of 
Misconduct 
The contract includes any stipulation that delays officer 
interviews or interrogations after alleged wrongdoing for 
a set length of time (for example, two days or twenty-four 
hours). 
Provides Access to 
Evidence Before 
Interview 
The contract provides officers with access to evidence 
before interviews or interrogations about alleged 
wrongdoing (for example, complete investigative files or 
statements from other witnesses). 
Limits Consideration of 
Disciplinary History 
The contract mandates the destruction or purging of 
disciplinary records from personnel files after a set length 
of time, or limits the consideration of disciplinary records 
in future employment actions. 
Limits Length of 
Investigation or 
Establishes Statute of 
Limitations 
The contract prohibits the interrogation, investigation, or 
punishment of officers on the basis of alleged wrongdoing 
if too much time has elapsed since its alleged occurrence, 
or since the initiation of the investigation.  
Limits Anonymous 
Complaints 
The contract prohibits supervisors from interrogating, 
investigating, or disciplining officers on the basis of 
anonymous civilian complaints. 
Limits Civilian Oversight 
The contract prohibits civilian groups from acquiring the 
authority to investigate, discipline, or terminate officers 
for alleged wrongdoing. 
Permits or Requires 
Arbitration 
The contract permits or requires arbitration of disputes 
related to disciplinary penalties or termination. 
Using the definitions in Figure 1, I then coded the sample of 178 
police union contracts to determine the frequency of each of these 
categories of potentially problematic disciplinary provisions—that is, 
to determine whether each contract contained language consistent with 
the definition listed in Figure 1. To ensure reliability, I analyzed each 
contract two separate times. To ensure replicability, I have made all of 
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the union contracts examined in this study publicly available.131 The full 
results of this analysis can be found in Appendix B.  
Admittedly, this analysis does not capture all potentially 
problematic provisions in police union contracts. In examining each 
union contract, I also identified a number of somewhat less frequent 
but nonetheless troubling provisions that may directly or indirectly 
impede officer accountability. For instance, one contract requires the 
police chief to solicit union approval before enacting any policy 
changes not explicitly identified in the contract.132 At least one contract 
bars internal investigators from using lineups during internal 
investigations.133 A few contracts bar internal investigators from 
searching officers’ lockers.134 And a significant number of contracts 
require the municipality to indemnify officers in cases of civil 
judgments.135  
Police-reform advocates may argue that any of these provisions 
constitutes a significant limitation on officer accountability. However, 
these sorts of provisions seemed less prevalent than the categories 
identified in Figure 1. The next Part discusses the content of police 
union contracts and demonstrates how these problematic provisions 
limit officer accountability. 
 
 131. All of these collective bargaining agreements are available to the public for download 
with a Dropbox account at the following link, temporarily housed at https://goo.gl/Jy8aQg 
[https://perma.cc/8CC2-ZJW5]. They are also on file with the Duke Law Journal.  
 132. SALT LAKE CITY CORP., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN SALT LAKE 
CITY CORPORATION AND THE SALT LAKE POLICE ASSOCIATION 9 (2014) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 133. CITY OF EVANSVILLE, A RESOLUTION OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
EVANSVILLE RATIFYING, CONFIRMING, AUTHORIZING AND APPROVING AN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE CITY OF EVANSVILLE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE EVANSVILLE 
NO. 73 INC. 25 (2016) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“A member shall not be compelled to 
appear in a formal police line-up in any administrative investigation . . . .”). 
 134. See, e.g., id. at 24; CITY OF TOPEKA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF TOPEKA AND 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE NO. 3, at 75 (2016) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(“Topeka Police Officers shall not have their lockers or other space for storage that is assigned to 
the officer searched, except with the officer’s permission and in his/her presence.”).  
 135. See, e.g., CITY OF ANN ARBOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
CITY OF ANN ARBOR AND ANN ARBOR POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION FOR POLICE SERVICE 
SPECIALISTS 51 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he Employer will indemnify and 
defend employees in connection with liability claims arising out of the performance of the 
employee’s police duties.”); CITY OF DAVENPORT, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF 
DAVENPORT, IOWA AND UNION OF PROFESSIONAL POLICE, INC. 28 (July 1, 2013) (“[T]he city 
shall fully indemnify and hold harmless the employees of the Union with respect to any liability 
arising out of the performance of their duties.”).  
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IV.  HOW MANY POLICE UNION CONTRACTS 
LIMIT ACCOUNTABILITY 
I find that police union contracts commonly contain provisions 
that can insulate frontline officers from accountability and oversight. 
A large number of police union contracts delay officer interrogations 
after alleged misconduct and require investigators to provide officers 
with access to evidence before beginning interrogations.136 Many call 
for the destruction of officer personnel records after a set period of 
time.137 Multiple contracts attempt to ban or limit the scope of civilian 
oversight.138 And many bar management from investigating 
anonymous complaints, limit the statute of limitations, or limit the 
length of investigations.139 Figure 2 offers a detailed breakdown of the 
prevalence of these common provisions in the twenty-five largest cities 
that permit collective bargaining. 
Figure 2: Problematic Provisions in Contracts Governing Police 
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Boston               
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 136. See infra Part IV.A. 
 137. See infra Part IV.B. 
 138. See infra Part IV.C. 
 139. See infra Part IV.D.  
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Detroit               
El Paso               
Fort Worth               
Houston               
Indianapolis               
Jacksonville               
Las Vegas               
Los Angeles               
Memphis               
New York               
Philadelphia               
Phoenix               
Portland               
San Antonio               
San Diego               
San Francisco               
San Jose               
Seattle               
Washington, D.C.               
Note: The darkened boxes indicate the presence of a problematic provision identified in 
 the coding scheme. 
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A full breakdown of the collective bargaining agreements from all 
178 cities can be found in Appendix B.140 Overall, 156 of the 178 police 
union contracts examined in this study—around 88 percent—
contained at least one provision that could thwart legitimate 
disciplinary actions against officers engaged in misconduct. The 
sections that follow discuss some of the most common ways that police 
union contracts limit investigations of officer misconduct.  
A. Officer Interrogations 
Imagine if, before interrogating a suspect, police officers had to 
provide the suspect with written statements from all other witnesses 
with knowledge of the crime. Imagine if, prior to conducting 
interrogations, police officers were required to provide suspects and 
their attorneys with a full and truthful accounting of all the evidence 
against them. And imagine if police were required to provide all 
suspects and their attorneys with advance notice—anywhere from 
twenty-four hours to ten days in length—before conducting 
interrogations. Most experienced police officers would balk at such 
hindrances on their ability to interrogate criminal suspects. They might 
understandably tell you that such limitations would make it 
unreasonably difficult to elicit incriminating statements from suspects.  
These are just a handful of the procedural requirements that some 
union contracts promise to police officers during internal 
investigations.141 Many of the collective bargaining agreements in this 
study place some significant limitation on the interrogations of police 
officers—particularly those in states that do not already provide 
comparable protections through LEOBRs. A few of these limitations 
are uncontroversial. For instance, many collective bargaining 
agreements allow officers to obtain advice from legal counsel.142 Some 
 
 140. In addition to the problematic provisions identified in Figure 2, some collective 
bargaining agreements also include language that indemnifies police officers found liable in the 
event of civil judgments, mandates paid time off for police officers who kill civilians in the line of 
duty, and places additional limitations on the interrogation of police officers. 
 141. The discovery of just a few of these procedural protections in individual departments has 
led some in the press to observe that officers are treated significantly better than private citizens 
during interrogations. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, The Special Treatment Louisiana Gives to 
Police Officers Suspected of a Crime, SLATE (July 6, 2016, 2:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/the_slatest/2016/07/06/alton_sterling_police_officers_won_t_have_police_bill_of_rights_to
_protect.html [https://perma.cc/95H3-ELES] (examining the treatment of Louisiana police 
officers after allegations of criminal conduct in the wake of the Alton Sterling shooting). 
 142. See, e.g., CITY OF LOUISVILLE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BY AND 
BETWEEN LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT AND RIVER CITY 
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contracts also provide officers with basic protections against abuse 
during interrogations. Professor Kate Levine has persuasively argued 
that it is advantageous to provide basic interrogation protections that 
insulate frontline officers from undergoing lengthy interrogations, 
discourage inducements through threats or promises of leniency, and 
guarantee basic necessities like regular meals, sleep, and bathroom 
use.143 This Article makes no objection to such reasonable 
accommodations during interrogations.  
Some other limitations on the interrogation of frontline officers, 
though, appear designed to insulate them from accountability rather 
than to protect their basic rights. For instance, a number of cities, 
including Albuquerque,144 Anchorage,145 Austin,146 Chandler,147 
 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #614, POLICE OFFICER AND SERGEANTS 18–19 (2013) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing the right to counsel for officers facing questions 
after using deadly force); CITY OF ORLANDO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF ORLANDO 
AND ORLANDO LODGE #25, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, INC. 3–4 (2013) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (giving officers implicated in a disciplinary investigation the right to have a 
union representative and/or counsel present during interactions with internal-affairs 
investigators). 
 143. Levine, supra note 79, at 1241–46.  
 144. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF 
ALBUQUERQUE AND ALBUQUERQUE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 31 (2014) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (permitting officers to have two hours to consult with counsel before 
providing statements). 
 145. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
ANCHORAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND MUNICIPALITY OF 
ANCHORAGE 8 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (guaranteeing officers at least twenty-
four hours’ notice before any noncriminal misconduct interview).  
 146. CITY OF AUSTIN, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF AUSTIN AND THE AUSTIN 
POLICE ASSOCIATION 50 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (guaranteeing officers at 
least forty-eight hours’ notice before providing a statement regarding a disciplinary investigation, 
and requiring that officers receive a copy of the complaint, including the names of the person(s) 
making the complaint).  
 147. CITY OF CHANDLER, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY OF 
CHANDLER AND CHANDLER LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION 11 (2013) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (designating a forty-eight-hour waiting period for interviews of officers after 
officer-involved shootings, but providing an exception that would allow the chief to dismiss this 
waiting period under certain circumstances).  
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Chicago,148 Columbus,149 Corpus Christi,150 El Paso,151 Fort Worth,152 
Houston,153 Kansas City,154 Louisville,155 Miami,156 Minneapolis,157 San 
 
 148. CITY OF CHI., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF POLICE 
AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CHICAGO LODGE NO. 7, at 6 (2012) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (providing that an interview be “postponed for a reasonable time,” but for 
no more than forty-eight hours from the time the officer is informed of a request for an interview).  
 149. CITY OF COLUMBUS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF COLUMBUS AND FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE, CAPITAL CITY LODGE NO. 9, at 14 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (guaranteeing officers at least twenty-four hours’ notice before disciplinary interviews, 
unless otherwise necessary).  
 150. CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI AND 
THE CORPUS CHRISTI POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 16 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (guaranteeing officers at least forty-eight hours’ notice before disciplinary interviews, 
absent exigent circumstances).  
 151. CITY OF EL PASO, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF EL PASO, TEXAS AND 
EL PASO MUNICIPAL POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 55 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (establishing a forty-eight hour waiting period, except in exigent circumstances, before 
any disciplinary interviews of officers regarding critical incidents, officer-involved shootings, and 
deaths in custody).  
 152. CITY OF FORT WORTH, MEET AND CONFER LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF 
FORT WORTH, TEXAS AND FORT WORTH POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 15 (2013) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (establishing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any 
disciplinary interviews of officers, except in exigent circumstances, and guaranteeing that officers 
receive a signed explanation of the basis for an interview).  
 153. CITY OF HOUSTON, MEET & CONFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HOUSTON POLICE 
OFFICERS’ UNION AND THE CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS 39–40 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (establishing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any disciplinary interviews of 
officers). 
 154. CITY OF KAN. CITY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF 
POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI AND FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE 
LODGE NO. 99, at 9 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing officers with twenty-
four hours to secure counsel and forty-eight hours to provide statements).  
 155. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, supra note 142, at 16 (requiring that investigators provide officers 
with written notice of upcoming interrogations at least forty-eight hours in advance).  
 156. CITY OF MIAMI, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF MIAMI, MIAMI, FLORIDA AND 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, WALTER E. HEADLEY, JR., MIAMI LODGE NO. 20, at 15–16 
(2012) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (choosing not to designate a specific period of time 
for the delay of officer interviews, but stipulating that before any officer interview happens, all 
identifiable witnesses must be interviewed, if possible, and the officer must be given “all witness 
statements, including all other existing subject officer statements, and all other existing evidence, 
including, but not limited to, incident reports, GPS locator information, and audio or video 
recordings relating to the incident under investigation”).  
 157. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS 
AND THE POLICE OFFICERS’ FEDERATION OF MINNEAPOLIS 4 (2012) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (establishing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any disciplinary interviews).  
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Antonio,158 San Diego,159 Seattle,160 and Washington, D.C.,161 delay 
officer interrogations anywhere from a few hours to several days after 
suspected misconduct—and, in many cities, even after officer-involved 
shootings. In total, fifty of the municipalities in this study delay 
interrogations by some substantial period of time.162 A smaller, but still 
significant, number of municipalities (thirty-four) mandate that 
supervisors provide frontline officers with copies of all evidence of 
wrongdoing against them hours or even days in advance of 
interrogations.163  
Union leaders may argue that by delaying interrogations and 
providing officers with access to the evidence against them, these 
contracts prevent investigators from taking advantage of officers. 
While concerns about coercion are understandable, these policies are 
contrary to recognized best practices in law enforcement.164 Federal 
consent decrees, including those in Los Angeles,165 Seattle,166 New 
 
 158. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, 
TEXAS AND THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 81 (2009) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (providing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any disciplinary 
interviews of officers).  
 159. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BY AND BETWEEN CITY OF 
SAN DIEGO AND SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 49 (2015) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (establishing a three-working-day delay before investigators can conduct an 
interview with an officer under suspicion for a disciplinary violation, unless the delay will hamper 
the gathering of evidence).  
 160. CITY OF SEATTLE, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SEATTLE AND 
SEATTLE POLICE OFFICERS’ GUILD 11–12 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(guaranteeing officers anywhere from five to thirty days of notice before disciplinary interviews, 
except in exigent circumstances).  
 161. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE MPD LABOR COMMITTEE 14 (2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing 
a waiting period of up to two hours before investigators can interview an officer).  
 162. See infra Appendix C (first column entitled “Delays Interview”).  
 163. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix C (second column 
entitled “Access to Evidence Before Interview”).  
 164. WALKER, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that it is a “best practice” for investigators to 
question officers involved in shootings or other possible incidents of misconduct as soon after the 
incident as possible and noting that any delays in questioning may impair the ability to uncover 
what happened).  
 165. Consent Decree at 23–25, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 00-cv-11769-GAF-
RC (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006
.pdf [http://perma.cc/J2GK-PHXU] (mandating that supervisors report to the scene of categorical 
uses of force twenty-four hours a day and immediately separate officers before taking their 
statements).  
 166. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 25–28, United 
States v. Seattle, No. 12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2013), http://www.justice. 
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Orleans,167 and Albuquerque,168 require independent investigators to 
report to the scene of a serious use of force as soon as possible.169 All 
individuals involved in the incident should be separated immediately 
to prevent officers from “conspiring to create a story that exonerates 
any and all officers of misconduct.”170 These consent decrees  
require independent investigators to take statements as quickly as 
possible—generally at the scene of the incident.171  
However, many police union contracts prevent management from 
adopting these sorts of best practices. By delaying interrogations, and 
in some cases providing officers with full access to all evidence against 
them, these contracts provide officers with ample time to coordinate 
stories in a way that shifts blame away from the police.  
B. Disciplinary Records 
As discussed in Part I.D, a handful of state laws already limit 
public access to police disciplinary records.172 Such laws are troubling 
because they prevent public oversight of internal police disciplinary 
decisions. Perhaps even more troubling, though, is that many police 
union contracts prevent even police chiefs from fully using officer 
disciplinary records. Instead, many police union contracts mandate the 
destruction of disciplinary records from officer personnel files after a 
set period, or prevent supervisors from considering prior disciplinary 
history when taking future employment action.  
For example, the City of Cleveland’s contract requires 
management to remove all verbal and written reprimands from 
 
gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW8X-WFEV] 
(requiring supervisors to both report to the scene of a use of injurious force and interview officers 
separately as soon as possible thereafter).  
 167. Consent Decree at 25–26, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-cv-01924-SM-
JCW (E.D. La. July 24, 2012) http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-LA-0001-0001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/PY76-PRBS] (requiring supervisors to report to the scene of serious uses of 
force, separate officers, and take statements from both officers and witnesses soon thereafter).  
 168. Settlement Agreement at 22–25, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-1025-
RB-SMV (D. N.M. Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/
12/19/apd_settlement_11-14-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5VA-X4RJ] (mandating an immediate 
response and interviews by supervisors of officers involved in uses of force).  
 169. WALKER, supra note 22, at 3. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Lewis, Veltman & Landen, supra note 105 (listing states where police personnel records 
are confidential either under a specific state statute—as in California, Delaware, and New York—
or under privacy or public-employee personnel exemptions to state open-record laws).  
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officers’ personnel files after six months.173 Further, it requires that 
supervisors must remove all disciplinary actions and penalties from 
officers’ personnel files after two years.174 This means that after two 
years, a police officer in Cleveland can have his or her personnel file 
wiped clean—even if that officer has previously engaged in a pattern 
of egregious misconduct that raises serious questions about whether he 
or she is fit to serve as a police officer. 
 
 173. CITY OF CLEVELAND, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF 
CLEVELAND AND CLEVELAND POLICE PATROLMEN’S ASSOCIATION NON-CIVILIAN 
PERSONNEL 7 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 174. Id. 
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Austin,175 Baltimore,176 Chicago,177 Cincinnati,178 Columbus,179 
Honolulu,180 Jacksonville,181 Las Vegas,182 Louisville,183 Miami,184 
Minneapolis,185 Seattle,186 and Washington, D.C.,187 are just a few of the 
cities from this study that mandate the removal of disciplinary records 
from personnel files over time. In total, eighty-seven of the cities 
studied have language in their collective bargaining agreements that 
 
 175. CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 146, at 54 (reducing suspensions of one to three days down 
to a written reprimand after two or three years, depending on the officers’ conduct during that 
time period).  
 176. CITY OF BALT., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BALTIMORE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE BALTIMORE CITY LODGE NO. 3, FRATERNAL ORDER OF 
POLICE, INC. UNIT I, at 24 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (agreeing to expunge 
allegations of misconduct from employees’ files after three years, if the complaint was found to 
be unsustained or unfounded, or if the employee was otherwise found not guilty).  
 177. CITY OF CHI., supra note 148, at 10–11 (retaining a record of reprimands and suspensions 
for between three and five years, but requiring the destruction of disciplinary records after five 
years for most complaints and after seven years for complaints of criminal conduct or excessive 
force).  
 178. CITY OF CINCINNATI, LABOR AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN QUEEN CITY LODGE 
NO. 69 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE AND THE CITY OF CINCINNATI 41–42 (2014) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (allowing the retention of records on disciplinary action that resulted in 
fewer than thirty days of punishment to be kept for three years, while allowing their retention for 
up to five years if the act resulted in thirty days or more of punishment).  
 179. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra note 149, at 25–28 (mandating the retention of disciplinary 
records in personnel files for between one and six years, depending on the type of record).  
 180. STATE OF HAWAII, AGREEMENT BETWEEN STATE OF HAWAII, CITY & COUNTY OF 
HONOLULU, COUNTY OF HAWAII, COUNTY OF MAUI, AND COUNTY OF KAUAI AND STATE OF 
HAWAII ORGANIZATION OF POLICE OFFICERS BARGAINING UNIT 12, at 42 (2011) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (requiring the removal of disciplinary records from personnel files after 
two years, and mandating their destruction after four years, retaining only a summary notation).  
 181. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE AND THE 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS THROUGH SERGEANTS 41 (2011) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (requiring that disciplinary information be discarded from personnel 
files one to five years after the incident, depending on the severity of the punishment).  
 182. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN LAS VEGAS 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION 
38–39 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (requiring the purging of disciplinary records 
after anywhere from three months to five years, depending on the severity of the violation).  
 183. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, supra note 155, at 22 (requiring the purging of so-called 
“supervisor files” after one year).  
 184. CITY OF MIAMI, supra note 156, at 18 (requiring the purging of personnel files within five 
years of termination or retirement, unless otherwise required by state law).  
 185. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 157, at 4 (requiring the purging of any records on a 
disciplinary action that does not result in punishment).  
 186. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 160, at 14 (requiring the purging of disciplinary files after 
the calendar year of the incident, plus three years).  
 187. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 161, at 18 (requiring, at the employee’s request, the 
purging of disciplinary files in cases that are found to be unsubstantiated).  
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requires the removal of personnel records at some point in the 
future.188 
Admittedly, there may be compelling policy reasons to erase 
records of minor mistakes by police officers after a set length of time. 
Evidence of prior wrongdoing may lose its probative or predictive 
value as time passes. For example, the fact that an officer showed up 
late to work five years ago likely has little to no bearing on his or her 
fitness as an officer today. Even so, a pattern of more serious civilian 
complaints over many decades—even if those complaints are rarely if 
ever sustained—is often demonstrative of a problem requiring 
management intervention.  
Within the law enforcement community, early intervention 
systems (EIS) have emerged as a so-called “best practice” over the last 
two decades.189 These are computerized databases that document 
“anywhere from five to twenty-five performance indicators” for 
individual police officers over time.190 An emerging consensus suggests 
that all civilian complaints and reported uses of force, regardless of the 
outcome of any subsequent investigation, should be included in the 
EIS.191 Because of the highly unstructured nature of police work, it is 
often difficult to prove definitively that an officer engaged in 
misconduct, in part because investigators must typically weigh the 
officer’s word against a civilian’s word. While modern technological 
tools like body cameras may somewhat level the playing field in these 
investigations, these tools only provide one angle on interactions 
between civilians and police.192  
This is why EIS remains a critical tool for identifying problematic 
police officers. If a department is using an effective EIS, an officer with 
an unusually large number of civilian complaints relative to his or her 
peers—even if these complaints are all or mostly not sustained—should 
trigger additional management scrutiny.193 The story of Chicago police 
 
 188. See infra Appendix C (third column entitled “Limits Consideration of Disciplinary 
History”).  
 189. WALKER, supra note 22, at 6.  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id.  
 192. See Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 
840 (2015) (discussing the various limitations of body cameras, including the “length, clarity, 
lighting, distance, angle, scope, steadiness, manner of shooting, [and] quality” of the video). 
 193. WALKER, supra note 22, at 6. Walker notes: 
An EIS includes all citizen complaints and all reported uses of force regardless of the 
outcome of the department investigation of each incident. The basic principle is that 
an EIS should capture the most complete picture of an officer’s performance. Most 
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 
1232  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1191 
officer Jason Van Dyke demonstrates how historical recordkeeping of 
civilian complaints, when combined with an effective EIS, could 
proactively identify dangerous officers before their behavior escalates. 
As discussed above, civilians had filed twenty complaints against Van 
Dyke in the years leading up to the Laquan McDonald shooting.194 
None of these complaints resulted in punishment.195  
This is not particularly surprising, given that records obtained by 
Professor Craig Futterman revealed that less than 2 percent of the 
28,567 civilian complaints against Chicago police officers between 2011 
and 2015 resulted in discipline.196 If Chicago had used a comprehensive 
EIS to assess officer risk, the city would have noticed that Van Dyke 
was the subject of more civilian complaints than almost all other 
Chicago police officers.197 By mandating the destruction of disciplinary 
records in officer personnel records, many modern police union 
contracts make it nearly impossible for police chiefs to identify such 
troubling patterns in officer behavior.  
C. Civilian Oversight 
Since the early twentieth century, civil rights advocates have 
recognized the importance of civilian oversight of police behavior. As 
early as 1928, the Los Angeles Committee on Constitutional Rights 
argued that private citizens should examine citizen complaints and  
help citizens file complaints.198 The Wickersham Commission 
Report199—one of the first national reports to identify and discuss 
police misconduct as a widespread problem—recommended that 
police departments establish civilian agencies to help victims of police 
 
citizen complaints are not sustained, but it is a revealing indicator of an officer’s 
performance if an officer receives complaints at a much higher rate than peer officers. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 194. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 195. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 196. CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, supra note 17.  
 197. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 198. JACK MCDEVITT, AMY FARRELL & W. CARSTEN ANDRESEN, NE. UNIV. INST. ON 
RACE & JUSTICE, ENHANCING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS AND 
USE OF FORCE IN THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3–4 (2005), http://www.nlg-npap.org/
sites/default/files/Northeasternreport12-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFE2-ZG92]. 
 199. For a summary of some of the important findings from the Wickersham Commission 
Report, see Samuel Walker, Introduction to RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON 
LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PART 1: RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OFFICIAL 
LAWLESSNESS, at v–vi (1997), http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/1965_
wickershamcommpt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ8Y-J5T2]. 
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misconduct file complaints.200 It was not until the last several decades, 
though, that the number of civilian review boards increased 
substantially—from thirteen in 1980,201 to thirty-eight in 1990,202 to 
around seventy in 1995.203  
According to one 2003 estimate, civilian review boards existed in 
some form in around 80 percent of large American police 
departments.204 But even as civilian review boards have grown in 
importance, police unions have attempted to use the collective 
bargaining process to block civilian power to oversee police discipline. 
In total, forty-two municipalities examined in this study have union 
contracts that limit civilian oversight in some way.205 
Some contracts, like Miami’s collective bargaining agreement, go 
so far as to dictate the composition of the administrative board tasked 
with handing out discipline in cases of officer misconduct. Per the 
Miami agreement, this administrative board consists exclusively of 
fellow officers—the majority of whom are selected by the officer under 
investigation.206 Other contracts, like those in Baltimore,207 
 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id.  
 202. SAMUEL WALKER & BETSY WRIGHT, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CITIZEN 
REVIEW OF THE POLICE, 1994: A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/
publications/abstract.aspx?ID=155242 [https://perma.cc/3LS6-TKDK].  
 203. Id.  
 204. Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Civilian Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
653, 653 (2003). 
 205. See infra Appendix B (column labeled “Limits Civilian Oversight”).  
 206. CITY OF MIAMI, supra note 156, at 28. The Miami CBA states: 
All sworn bargaining unit members, prior to the final determination of a monetary fine, 
forfeiture of time and/or suspension in excess of two (2) tours of duty, demotion or 
dismissal shall, upon written request of the accused, if submitted within ten (10) 
working days, be afforded a review of the recommended action by a board composed 
of five (5) members of the Department, two (2) members selected by the Department 
Head and three (3) members selected by the bargaining unit member from a standing 
list.  
Id. 
 207. CITY OF BALTIMORE, supra note 176, at 20, 22 (“Any employee suspended from duty 
with pay shall be given a suspension hearing as soon as reasonable following the suspension from 
duty, wherein a determination will be made at that time whether or not the employee shall remain 
suspended with or without pay and/or be placed on administrative duties. . . . No civilians other 
than an Administrative Law Judge may serve on a Departmental Hearing Board.”).  
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Cleveland,208 San Antonio,209 and San Diego,210 keep civilians from 
having the final say in police discipline. Several others, like those in 
Austin,211 Columbus,212 Los Angeles,213 Seattle,214 St. Louis,215 and 
Washington, D.C.,216 establish methods for disciplinary determinations 
that do not seem to leave room for civilian oversight.  
Police union opposition to civilian oversight is nothing new. 
Historians have observed that many of the earliest experiments with 
civilian review boards were killed off because of “implacable 
opposition from police unions.”217 In fact, the rise of civilian oversight 
may be one of the reasons for the rise of police unionization. As police 
unions “began to resurface in the late 1960s, opposition to civilian 
 
 208. CITY OF CLEVELAND, supra note 173, at 56. The contract vests discipline power in the 
chief of police and the director of public safety, who is a former Cleveland chief of police. 
Discipline power is prohibited for Cleveland’s civilian Police Review Board. See id. at 93 (“The 
undersigned parties to this Agreement agree that the Police Review Board cannot require the 
Chief of Police or the Safety Director to act in violation of the terms of this agreement.”). 
 209. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, supra note 158, at 85 (“Each board shall make independent 
recommendations . . . . Such recommendations are advisory only and are not binding on the Chief. 
The Citizen Advisory Action Board may not conduct a separate independent investigation but 
may recommend to the Chief of Police that further investigations should be undertaken.”). 
 210. See CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 159, at 53. Although this particular contract does 
not clearly specify that the chief has the sole authority to impose discipline, it does seemingly 
prevent policies from being implemented without the union’s consent. 
 211. CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 146, at 43 (“The final decision as to appropriate discipline 
is within the sole discretion of the Chief of Police . . . . Neither the OPM employees nor individual 
members of the Panel shall publicly express agreement or disagreement with the final disciplinary 
decision of the Chief, other than as set forth in the written recommendation.”).  
 212. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra note 149, at 22–23 (“An immediate supervisor’s 
recommendation to impose discipline at a higher level will require review by the member’s chain 
of command, in which case the final decision will be made by the Chief of Police.”).  
 213. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BY AND BETWEEN THE 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE 93 (2011) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (providing that the police chief must make final disciplinary 
decisions).  
 214. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 160, at 70 (“Only the Chief of Police . . . may impose 
discipline on bargaining unit members.”).  
 215. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS AND THE ST. LOUIS 
POLICE OFFICER’S ASSOCIATION/FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE 68, at 19–20 (2014) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (establishing a commission without citizen participation to 
make final determinations for all disciplinary action).  
 216. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 161, at 10 (giving the chief of police the final 
say on punishment).  
 217. David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 
572 (2008). 
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review was one of its chief rallying cries.”218 Ironically, despite police 
unions’ fears, the empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
civilians may not provide the sort of rigorous oversight of police 
misconduct that many had hoped.219  
Admittedly, civilian oversight has not proven to be “the panacea 
many expected it to be.”220 Despite their limitations, however, civilian 
review boards and other forms of community participation allow the 
community to reassert sovereignty over police, which can empower 
minority communities most subject to police abuse. Such oversight may 
be important symbolically in building community trust, ensuring 
transparency, and increasing the number of civilians willing to come 
forward with complaints against the police. 221 Police unions in several 
cities have been successful in using the collective bargaining process to 
block or severely limit this sort of civilian oversight and engagement. 
D. Investigation of Complaints 
Many police union contracts disqualify certain classes of civilian 
complaints. Thirty-two contracts limit management’s authority to 
investigate anonymous civilian complaints.222 Another forty-six 
 
 218. Id.; see ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 284–86 (1977); STEPHEN C. HALPERN, 
POLICE-ASSOCIATION AND DEPARTMENT LEADERS: THE POLITICS OF CO-OPTATION 87 (1974); 
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 278–81 (Simon & Schuster 1969). 
 219. See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REVIEW 138 (1994) 
(suggesting that civilians may be less likely to second-guess officers than fellow officers). It is also 
worth noting that a Bureau of Justice Statistics study of approximately eight hundred police 
departments found that departments that use civilian review boards receive twice as many 
complaints against frontline officers, but sustain only around half as many complaints. Sklansky, 
supra note 217, at 571–75. “The end result [is] that the number of sustained complaints in the two 
groups, adjusting for the number of officers employed, appear[s] to be roughly equal.” Id. at 573.  
 This is only one of several critiques of civilian review boards. Other scholars have 
suggested that civilian review boards, once constituted, are often dominated by police officers. 
This is because a number of civilian review boards are not entirely populated by civilians. They 
are often a mix of police and civilians. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 
HOW. L.J. 521, 547 (2015); Gregory D. Russell, The Political Ecology of Police Reform, 20 
POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 567, 567–76 (1997).  
 220. Livingston, supra note 204, at 653 (quoting Samuel Walker, Achieving Police 
Accountability, in RESEARCH BRIEF 1998, at 2 (Ctr. on Crime, Cmtys., & Culture, Occasional 
Paper Series No. 3, 1998)). 
 221. Sklansky, supra note 217, at 573 (“They may be important symbolically. They may be 
important for transparency, and for building public confidence. If nothing else, the availability of 
citizen review seems to make people much more willing to come forward with complaints against 
the police, and that alone is significant.”).  
 222. See infra Appendix B.  
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disqualify complaints after a set period of time,223 whether from the 
initiation of the investigation or from the time of the alleged 
misconduct. Albuquerque,224 Anchorage,225 Austin,226 Cincinnati,227 
Cleveland,228 Columbus,229 El Paso,230 Glendale,231 Honolulu,232 
Houston,233 Jersey City,234 Lincoln,235 San Antonio,236 San Diego,237 and 
Seattle238 are some of the cities that limit the investigation of civilian 
complaints in one of these two ways. Admittedly, there may be some 
 
 223. See infra Appendix B.  
 224. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, supra note 144, at 32 (limiting the length of internal 
investigations to ninety days).  
 225. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, supra note 145, at 8 (limiting the length of internal 
investigations of civilian complaints to forty-five days after initiation).  
 226. CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 146, at 48 (establishing a 180-day limit on disciplinary 
actions).  
 227. CITY OF CINCINNATI, supra note 178, at 42 (applying a three-year statute of limitations 
to disciplinary actions).  
 228. CITY OF CLEVELAND, supra note 173, at 10–11 (preventing the chief of police from 
punishing officers for any noncriminal complaint filed more than six months after the alleged 
event and for any charges brought after one year when based on an administrative investigation 
lacking a citizen’s complaint).  
 229. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra note 149, at 19–21 (stating that a citizen complaint must 
generally be filed within sixty days of an alleged event in order for management to conduct an 
investigation, and establishing a ninety-day period for investigations of civilian complaints).  
 230. CITY OF EL PASO, supra note 151, at 57 (stating that disciplinary action in noncriminal 
matters must be taken within 180 days of an incident, and disciplinary action in criminal matters 
must take place within two years of the incident, or within sixty days of its discovery, whichever 
is later).  
 231. CITY OF GLENDALE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY OF 
GLENDALE AND GLENDALE POLICE OFFICER’S COALITION 5–6 (2014) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (establishing strict time limitations on the investigation of anonymous complaints).  
 232. STATE OF HAW., supra note 180, at 22 (establishing a one-year statute of limitations for 
investigations of misconduct and disciplinary action). 
 233. CITY OF HOUSTON, supra note 153, at 40–41 (establishing a 180-day statute of limitations 
on disciplinary action based upon the date that the department learns of alleged wrongdoing).  
 234. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF JERSEY CITY AND JERSEY CITY 
POLICE OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 64–65 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(setting a time limit of fifteen to thirty days for disciplinary and criminal charges to be filed).  
 235. CITY OF LINCOLN, AGREEMENT BETWEEN LINCOLN POLICE UNION AND THE CITY OF 
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 19 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (prohibiting the 
investigation of complaints that allege misconduct taking place more than forty-five days ago, as 
well as requiring that the identity of complainants be revealed to officers).  
 236. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, supra note 158, at 78–79 (establishing a 180-day statute of 
limitations for internal investigations).  
 237. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 159, at 82–83 (establishing a one-year statute of 
limitations for disciplinary action).  
 238. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 160, at 10 (establishing a 180-day statute of limitations for 
internal investigations).  
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value in avoiding endless disciplinary investigations and discouraging 
frivolous civilian complaints. However, many of the limitations on the 
investigation of civilian complaints found in modern union contracts 
may go too far.  
First, bans on anonymous complaints may discourage some 
individuals from filing complaints against officers, particularly if they 
have been victims of police brutality and fear retribution. The history 
of American policing is rife with examples of police departments 
making it difficult to file complaints against frontline officers, including 
examples of police threatening those filing complaints.239 By 
preventing management from investigating anonymous civilian 
complaints, these contracts discourage some of the most vulnerable 
individuals from seeking redress for officer misconduct. For instance, 
these rules may discourage undocumented individuals from filing 
complaints against problematic officers, for fear of the legal 
consequences. This may allow patterns of egregious misconduct 
against insular minorities to continue without intervention.  
Second, clauses in police union contracts that establish statutes of 
limitations for the investigation of misconduct may frustrate 
accountability efforts. There is good reason to encourage the swift 
investigation and adjudication of civilian complaints whenever 
possible. It might incentivize investigators to act with reasonable 
diligence, so as to ensure the freshness of witness recollections and the 
availability of physical evidence. Nevertheless, some particularly 
egregious incidents of police misconduct may not come to light until 
years after they occurred. For example, one of the most notorious 
instances of documented police misconduct in American history is the 
so-called “midnight crew” led by Chicago Police Commander Jon 
Burge between 1972 and 1991.240 Burge and a handful of fellow officers 
 
 239. The events surrounding the Rodney King beating provide one example of this problem. 
After the horrendous incident, one of the passengers present at the incident told Paul King, 
Rodney King’s brother, about what had happened. Paul King went to the Foothill Police Station 
in Los Angeles to file a formal complaint on his brother’s behalf. The sergeant at the Foothill 
Police Station brought King’s brother to an interview room, where he waited for thirty minutes. 
Then, the sergeant allegedly questioned Paul about whether he had been in any trouble—a 
question that understandably troubled King’s brother, who was there to merely report his 
brother’s mistreatment. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
 240. Hal Dardick & John Byrne, Mayor: Approval of Burge Victims Fund a Step Toward 
‘Removing a Stain,’ CHI. TRIB. (May 6, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-city-
council-rauner-cupich-met-20150506-story.html [https://perma.cc/867E-6LP3] (describing efforts 
that Chicago has made to help victims of Burge’s torture, which lasted nearly two decades); 
Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments from DOJ Reforms, IN 
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tortured over 100 people, mostly black men, in Chicago’s impoverished 
South Side.241 The officers allegedly used “electric shocks, beatings, 
smotherings and simulated Russian roulette.”242 It was not until 1993 
that Chicago fired Burge—although his firing was not because of his 
decades of violence.243 Even as evidence of their misconduct became 
public, however, Chicago’s five-year statute of limitations—known as 
the “Burge rule”—prevented Chicago from investigating Burge and his 
fellow officers.244 In sum, a substantial number of these contracts limit 
the types of complaints that supervisors can investigate, either through 
statutes of limitations or bars on the investigation of anonymous 
complaints, thereby frustrating accountability efforts.  
E. Arbitration 
Finally, 115 of the union contracts studied in this Article contain 
language that permits or requires the use of arbitration in adjudicating 
officer appeals of disciplinary measures. Admittedly, arbitration is a 
common mechanism for adjudicating disputes in the public labor 
sector. State laws frequently bar certain classes of public employees, 
like police officers and firefighters, from striking in cases of labor 
disputes.245 Thus, mandatory arbitration provides a release valve in 
cases of intractable contractual disputes between police unions and 
management. To be clear, this Article makes no objection to the use of 
arbitration to settle most contractual disputes. Its use in disciplinary 
appeals, though, has raised serious concerns among policing scholars.  
Policing scholars have previously recognized that using arbitration 
as a disciplinary tool can frustrate police accountability. For one thing, 
 
THESE TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/features/police-killings-union-contracts.
html [https://perma.cc/D6QT-GBR8] (providing a brief description of the Burge incidents and 
using the phrase “midnight crew”).  
 241. Dardick & Byrne, supra note 240.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Christina Sterbenz, A Group of Rogue Cops Known as the ‘Midnight Crew’ Tortured 
Dozens of People for Decades—and Now Chicago Is Paying Millions for It, BUS. INSIDER  
(May 6, 2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-chicago-council-approves-reparations-
for-police-torture-victims-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/NRM6-CMC8] (“Burge was fired in 1993 
(although not directly as a result of the violence) and later convicted of lying about police torture 
in testimony he gave in civil lawsuits.”). 
 244. Emmanuel, supra note 240 (“Flint Taylor, a founding partner of the People’s Law Office 
who represented many Burge victims, blames this on what he calls ‘the Burge rule’—unless a 
police chief signs off, investigations of civilian complaints are subject to a five-year statute of 
limitations.”). 
 245. SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 58, at 8 (showing that only Ohio and Hawaii have not 
explicitly barred police strikes).  
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arbitration almost exclusively results in reductions in disciplinary 
penalties handed down against officers found guilty of professional 
misconduct.246 It also allows third parties, often from outside the 
community, to make final disciplinary decisions that can go against the 
will of police supervisors or civilian oversight entities.247  
In this way, arbitration can arguably constitute an antidemocratic 
limitation on public oversight of law enforcement behavior. 
Additionally, most states make arbitration decisions binding and limit 
judicial review of arbitration decisions.248 Given that the Supreme 
Court has held that the “refusal of courts to review the merits of an 
arbitration award is . . . proper,” an arbitrator “can be wrong on the 
facts and wrong on the law and a court will not overturn the arbitrator’s 
opinion.”249  
V.  IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES FOR REFORM 
This Article’s findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
police union contracts sometimes establish problematic internal 
disciplinary procedures that serve as barriers to accountability. 
Collective bargaining advocates have previously argued that the 
negotiation of disciplinary procedures by public-employee unions 
should not result in any problematic provisions because “[i]t will rarely 
be in the union’s interest, . . . even where feasible, to negotiate 
provisions that protect incompetent or abusive employees.”250  
However, it appears that expansive readings of state labor laws by 
employee-relations boards and courts have opened the door for police 
 
 246. See, e.g., CITY OF BURBANK, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CITY 
OF BURBANK AND THE BURBANK POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 57 (2009) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (limiting arbitrators’ ability to increase punishment, but providing no such 
limitation on their ability to decrease punishment); David Armstrong, Second Chance for Bad 
Cops, BOS. GLOBE, May 21, 2000, at A1 (providing an example of an agency that limits police 
officers’ accountability).  
 247. See, e.g., Jane Prendergast & Robert Anglen, 10 Fired Officers Returned to Force: City 
Lost All Cases Taken to Arbitration, CIN. ENQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2011, at A1 (describing how the 
City of Cincinnati lost a series of these appeals during arbitration, resulting in the city being forced 
to reduce punishment or reinstate officers whom the city had felt deserved harsher punishments).  
 248. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2210. 
 249. Id. (first quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); 
then quoting WILL AITCHISON, THE RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 98 (6th ed. 
2009)).  
 250. Hodges, supra note 70, at 147. Further, Professor Ann Hodges predicted that “union 
proposals for disciplinary standards and procedures will not be inimical to the merit principle.” 
Id. at 146. 
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unions to negotiate the inclusion of a range of questionable procedures 
that may “protect incompetent or abusive employees.”251 Excessively 
delaying interrogations of officers after alleged misconduct allows 
officers to coordinate stories in a way that deflects responsibility for 
wrongful behavior. The destruction of disciplinary records makes it 
more difficult for supervisors to identify officers engaged in a pattern 
of misconduct. The disqualification of entire classes of civilian 
complaints prevents supervisors from even investigating potentially 
abusive behavior. Limitations on civilian oversight and arbitration 
clauses rob the public of the opportunity to monitor police behavior. 
This Part discusses the implications of these findings for the broader 
literature on police regulation and offers some normative 
recommendations for reforming police labor law.  
A. Implications for Police-Reform Efforts 
The findings from this study suggest that internal police 
department procedures may limit the effectiveness of existing police-
reform efforts. For most of American history, policymakers have relied 
on an array of external legal mechanisms to discourage police 
wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has barred the admission of some 
evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Constitution via 
the exclusionary rule.252 Federal law empowers victims of police 
misconduct to bring civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police 
officers, and in some cases police departments.253 Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242, federal prosecutors can hold a police officer criminally liable for 
willfully depriving a person of civil rights.254 And state prosecutors can 
bring criminal charges against police officers, like any other person, in 
the event their conduct violates state criminal statutes. In a previous 
work, I have described this array of external legal mechanisms as “cost-
raising misconduct regulations” because they do not force local police 
departments to enact specific policies to combat police misconduct, but 
 
 251. Id. at 147.  
 252. See supra note 40. 
 253. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (establishing a statutory right for private litigants to bring civil 
suits against state agents who violate their “rights, privileges, or immunities”). 
 254. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (making it a federal crime for a police officer to violate a person’s 
constitutional rights under color of law while acting willfully and placing heavy criminal penalties 
on such behavior that leads to bodily injury); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS 
GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?: A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES 143 (1981), http://hdl.handle.
net/2027/uc1.32106015219253 [https://perma.cc/9TLE-4V4V]. 
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instead, they merely raise the cost of officer misconduct by exacting 
monetary, evidentiary, or criminal penalties.255  
In theory, as these external legal mechanisms increase the cost 
borne by police departments in cases of officer misconduct, police 
supervisors should rationally respond by improving officer training and 
designing internal procedures to ferret out officer wrongdoing. Yet in 
many of the nation’s largest cities, supervisors cannot always respond 
to external legal pressure by implementing rigorous disciplinary 
procedures because of collective bargaining agreements, civil service 
laws, and LEOBRs. Scholars have long lamented the apparent 
ineffectiveness of external legal mechanisms in bringing about reform 
in local police practices.256 A growing consensus in the late twentieth 
century emerged that these external, cost-raising mechanisms were 
sometimes ineffective at transforming the organizational culture or 
practices of police departments.257 In the past, participants in this 
conversation have not fully recognized the ways that police labor and 
employment law may contribute to questionable internal disciplinary 
measures. Even when faced with the sting of evidentiary exclusion or 
the heavy financial burden of civil suits, police union contracts can 
make it challenging for police chiefs to hold officers accountable for 
wrongdoing.  
It is also important to recognize the limitations of this Article’s 
findings. It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the collective 
bargaining process contributes to the lax disciplinary procedures 
identified in this Article. Even without the negotiation of internal 
procedures via the collective bargaining process, communities may 
have nevertheless enacted similar procedures through alternative 
processes. This Article does not show a causal relationship between the 
use of collective bargaining and the implementation of questionable 
disciplinary procedures. Nevertheless, this Article’s findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that police labor law can frustrate 
accountability efforts, thereby limiting the effectiveness of traditional, 
cost-raising forms of police regulation. More research is necessary to 
 
 255. Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 43, at 3196. 
 256. On the limitations of these existing mechanisms, see supra notes 40–42 and 
accompanying text.  
 257. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 515–25 (2004) (describing the organizational roots of police 
misconduct).  
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understand the relationship between collective bargaining and internal 
disciplinary procedures.  
Police union contracts can also thwart federal efforts to reform 
local police departments via structural reform litigation. In 1994, 
Congress authorized the U.S. attorney general to seek equitable relief 
against local and state police departments engaging in a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional misconduct under § 14141 of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.258 Effectively, this statute 
gives the DOJ the power to compel cities, under threat of litigation, to 
invest in costly reform measures aimed at curbing officer 
wrongdoing.259 The DOJ has used § 14141 to investigate and reform 
dozens of police departments.260 The DOJ has been careful to state in 
consent decrees and memorandums of understanding—like the one in 
Pittsburgh in 1997—that “[n]othing in this Decree is intended to alter 
the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal 
Order of Police.”261 Were the DOJ to attempt to overturn any language 
in Pittsburgh’s collective bargaining agreement, the Fraternal Order of 
Police may have had standing to challenge the federal consent decree, 
which could have led to a broader challenge to the constitutionality of 
the DOJ’s recommended reforms. So instead, the DOJ has opted to 
work around police union contracts. As the former chief of the Special 
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division explained, this means 
that police union contracts narrow the field of reforms that the DOJ 
can request in § 14141 cases.262  
 
 258. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority . . . to 
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons 
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . .”). Under § 14141, 
relief can be sought “[w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe” that there 
is a pattern or practice of misconduct by “obtain[ing] appropriate equitable and declaratory relief 
to eliminate the pattern or practice” in a civil action. Id.  
 259. See generally Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 43, at 1367–77 (providing a 
detailed look at the DOJ’s use of § 14141, based on semistructured interviews with stakeholders 
involved in the process).  
 260. Rushin, Using Data, supra note 122, at 157 (stating that the DOJ investigated about fifty-
five police departments and reached settlements with twenty-two of these agencies between 1994 
and 2012). 
 261. Consent Decree at 4, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-cv-00354 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 
26, 1997), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0003-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W65H-DSV4].  
 262. Jonathan M. Smith, Police Unions Must Not Block Reform, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/police-unions-must-not-block-reform.html [https://
perma.cc/TM8G-G8R9] (stating that “[i]n big cities, where police unions have political clout, rigid 
union contracts also restricted the ability of police chiefs and civilian oversight bodies to tackle 
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 
2017] POLICE UNION CONTRACTS 1243 
In at least seven of these § 14141 cases—Albuquerque, Los 
Angeles, Newark, Pittsburgh, Portland, Seattle, and the Virgin 
Islands—existing collective bargaining provisions presented a 
roadblock to federal reform efforts.263 In Pittsburgh, the union contract 
has prevented investigators from considering all complaints because of 
a clause that establishes a ninety-day statute of limitations on civilian-
complaint investigations.264 In Portland, a union contract provision that 
prevents investigators from talking to officers for forty-eight hours 
after a use-of-force incident has hampered federal efforts to reform 
internal investigations.265 And in Newark, the Fraternal Order of Police 
has tried to block the creation of a civilian oversight entity that could 
review complaints, impose disciplinary actions, and recommend 
policies to improve policing, arguing that such a move would violate its 
collective bargaining agreement.266 
When Congress passed § 14141, numerous policing scholars hailed 
the measure as one of the most important regulations of officer 
misconduct in American history, claiming that it could potentially 
transform the organizational culture in American police 
departments.267 Until recently, though, little scholarship has recognized 
how state labor laws can frustrate the enforcement of § 14141. In sum, 
the evidence from this Article suggests that police union contracts may 
pose an underappreciated barrier to police reform. 
B. Reforming Police Labor Laws 
Police officers need reasonable procedural safeguards during 
disciplinary investigations. At the same time, these procedural 
protections should not go so far as to shield offending officers from 
accountability. Unfortunately, in many of the nation’s largest cities, it 
appears that the balance may have tipped too heavily in favor of 
 
misconduct” and “[a]s a result, an officer involved in a shooting often cannot be interviewed at 
the scene; internal affairs investigators have to wait days to get a statement”).  
 263. Emmanuel, supra note 240 (citing these cities as cases where DOJ reform efforts were 
stalled or delayed because of collective bargaining provisions, and stating that, “[i]n these cities, 
police contract protections appear to have weakened or stalled efforts to improve the handling of 
police misconduct, to create or extend civilian oversight, or to establish early-warning systems for 
problem cops”).  
 264. Id.  
 265. Id.  
 266. Id.  
 267. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
798–99 (2006); see also Armacost, supra note 257, at 457 (stating that § 14141 is “perhaps the most 
promising legal mechanism” for reducing police misconduct). 
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protecting police officers while handcuffing internal investigations. In 
many localities across the country, police officers receive more 
procedural protections than other government employees during 
disciplinary investigations.268 If, as hypothesized, the structure of the 
collective bargaining process contributes to the development of these 
questionable disciplinary procedures, policymakers ought to rethink 
the structure of the collective bargaining process in American police 
departments. To address this hypothesized problem, this Article 
suggests a few ways that states could amend labor laws to increase 
transparency and community participation in the development of 
police disciplinary procedures.  
First, states could amend their labor laws to require municipalities 
to make collective bargaining sessions over police disciplinary 
procedures open to the public. In so doing, states could require 
municipalities to make drafts of police disciplinary procedures 
available to the public before ratification. Or, perhaps more radically, 
states could democratize the development of police disciplinary 
measures by requiring that they be developed outside of the collective 
bargaining process in a manner that incorporates input from the public 
and relevant interest groups.  
This public process could take many different forms. Communities 
could elect civilians to a commission tasked with the creation of police 
disciplinary procedures, with recommendations from police 
management and union leaders. Communities could establish notice-
and-comment procedures, similar to those employed by many 
administrative agencies, to promulgate disciplinary policies. 
Conversely, states could require communities to establish police 
disciplinary procedures in the same manner that they establish 
municipal ordinances—presumably through a public hearing and vote 
by local elected officials. Any of these approaches would provide the 
public with a greater opportunity to shape police disciplinary measures 
than currently exists in many localities, while still permitting police 
unions to negotiate collectively on a wide range of topics, including 
salaries, benefits, retirement, vacation time, holidays, promotion 
standards, and more.  
Increased transparency and public participation may result in 
more balanced police disciplinary procedures that do not afford 
 
 268. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 141 (discussing the special rights that Louisiana “gives law 
enforcement officers suspected of illegal conduct [that go] far beyond those afforded to regular 
citizens”).  
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officers an unreasonable advantage during internal investigations. 
First, these proposals would increase participation by stakeholders 
whom state labor laws currently exclude from the traditional collective 
bargaining process—namely, minority groups most at risk of 
experiencing police misconduct. In most states, collective bargaining 
happens outside of the public view. Only eight states require 
municipalities to conduct bargaining sessions related to police 
disciplinary policies in public.269 Only four states require municipalities 
to make drafts of police disciplinary procedures public before ratifying 
collective bargaining agreements.270  
The collective bargaining process generally excludes individuals 
most at risk of experiencing police misconduct. During these 
negotiations, a typical bargaining team for the municipality may 
include a chief negotiator, the budget or finance director, legal counsel, 
a representative from human resources, the police chief or some other 
high-ranking supervisor from the police department, and middle 
management from the police department like sergeants, lieutenants, 
and captains.271 The police union bargaining team will typically include 
a union representative, a union negotiator, and in some cases, a handful 
of rank-and-file officers.272 Typically missing from the bargaining table 
is any party likely to prioritize the interests of minority groups most at 
risk of police misconduct. This Article’s proposal represents a more 
collaborative approach to the negotiation of police disciplinary policies 
that would ensure the participation of more relevant stakeholders.  
Second, some of these proposals would force municipalities to 
consider the merits of police disciplinary procedures on their own, 
rather than having them become a bargaining chip in a broader 
budgetary negotiation. As currently structured, most municipalities 
negotiate with police unions about disciplinary procedures alongside 
salaries, benefits, vacation time, promotion procedures, and more. 
Under these conditions, it is not uncommon for the two sides to make 
 
 269. These states are Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and Texas. 
Two states—Alaska and Colorado—only provide for such transparency in collective bargaining 
sessions involving teachers. ABRAHAM, supra note 39, at 5–8 (providing links to various state 
statutes).  
 270. These states are Florida, Montana, Ohio, and Texas. Id.  
 271. SAM ASHBAUGH, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, AN ELECTED OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO 
NEGOTIATING AND COSTING LABOR CONTRACTS 11–13 (2003), http://www.gfoa.org/sites/
default/files/AnElectedOfficialsGuideToNegotiatingAndCostingLaborContracts.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9PAL-6TC7]. 
 272. Id. at 14.  
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trade-offs—for example, a police union may accept a smaller than 
desired raise in officer salaries in exchange for more control over 
disciplinary procedures.273  
Even for municipalities that are ideologically opposed to such 
disciplinary concessions, the temptation can be irresistible if such a 
concession results in a smaller hit to the municipal budget. Chicago 
presents a cautionary tale of how municipalities that are strapped for 
cash have strong incentives to offer concessions on officer 
accountability in return for lower officer salaries. In the wake of the 
Laquan McDonald shooting, an investigation by the Chicago Tribune 
found that “[f]rom the moment Chicago’s Fraternal Order of Police 
started negotiating its first contract with City Hall 35 years ago, the 
union identified an issue that would prove key to its members: ensuring 
officers had robust protections when they were investigated for 
misconduct.”274  
By contrast, cash-strapped Chicago officials have been primarily 
concerned with holding “tight on the bottom line” by avoiding 
significant increases in salaries and benefits.275 When it became 
apparent during negotiations that Chicago—a city that was facing a 
significant budget crunch—could not meet union salary demands, the 
Fraternal Order of Police instead demanded that Chicago “pony up” 
by making concessions on disciplinary procedures.276 And once 
Chicago agreed to these lenient disciplinary procedures, it found it 
difficult to revert back.277  
The proposals in this Article could help remedy this problem. By 
forcing municipalities and police unions to negotiate disciplinary 
procedures in transparent hearings, the public may be put on notice if 
cities are using lax disciplinary procedures as a bargaining chip to 
secure lower officer salaries. This, in turn, may discourage such trade-
 
 273. Id. at 66 (advising government officials to avoid the temptation to trade management 
control of employees in exchange for economic concessions); John Chase & David Heinzmann, 
Cops Traded Away Pay for Protections in Police Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016,  
8:36 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-contracts-fop-
20160520-story.html [https://perma.cc/3H2D-DH24].  
 274. Chase & Heinzmann, supra note 273.  
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. (quoting former Fraternal Order of Police President John Dineen, who said candidly 
that “[t]he city didn’t have a lot of money but they wanted to keep the police happy, so they’d tell 
us what we’d get” and “[i]t was always working conditions versus money”).  
 277. Id. (discussing in part the efforts by the city to establish a shorter waiting period before 
interviewing police officers after officer-involved shootings and describing how these efforts were 
ultimately overturned by an arbitrator ruling in 2011).  
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offs, thereby forcing the municipalities and police unions to negotiate 
the content of disciplinary procedures as a standalone issue, with the 
benefit of public input.  
Third, and relatedly, transparency is likely to reduce regulatory 
capture and corruption.278 Scholars have documented that police 
unions are a powerful political constituency.279 Police union support 
can be pivotal in local and state elections.280 Thus, there is legitimate 
concern that the collective bargaining process in police departments 
“amount[s] to a division of spoils” rather than a thoughtful 
compromise.281 By opening up the negotiation process to the public, 
relevant stakeholders should, theoretically, be able to monitor the 
actions of municipal officials during the negotiation of police union 
contracts and prevent the kind of troubling disciplinary trade-offs that 
have happened in major cities like Chicago. 
C. Limitations on Reform  
Nevertheless, police union leaders and other critics may object to 
increasing transparency and public participation in the development of 
police disciplinary procedures for several reasons. To begin with, some 
point out that this Article’s proposal treats police officers differently 
than other public employees. State labor laws allow virtually all other 
groups of public employees to bargain about disciplinary procedures 
without the additional burden of a public, participatory process as 
proposed in this Article. Why should police officers be any different?  
This Article argues that, because of the power wielded by frontline 
officers and the high social cost of officer misconduct,282 the public 
 
 278. See generally Mehmet Bac, Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better 
Screen Imply a Better Scene?, 107 PUB. CHOICE 87 (2001) (arguing that a higher level of 
transparency increases the probability of corruption detection); Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel 
Naurin, Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption, 31 
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 301 (2010) (arguing that while transparency is an important tool for reducing 
corruption in government institutions, it is most effective when there is a strong education system, 
an independent press, and free and fair elections).  
 279. See, e.g., Douthat, supra note 123 (noting that even among conservative Republicans who 
generally oppose public-employee unionization in other contexts, police unions have maintained 
strong public support; in fact, police unions have been “insulated from any real pressure to 
reform”).  
 280. Id.  
 281. Id.  
 282. See generally, e.g., VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND 
LATINO BOYS (2011) (describing the social costs of negative police interactions with communities 
of color in Oakland, California).  
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ought to have greater input in the development of police disciplinary 
procedures. Unlike other public employees, police officers generally 
carry firearms, make investigatory stops, conduct arrests, and use lethal 
force when needed. Additionally, municipalities necessarily give 
frontline police officers significantly more discretion than other public 
employees.283 Officers encounter “people when they are both most 
threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are 
frightened, when they are desperate, when they are drunk, when they 
are violent, and when they are ashamed.”284  
While discretion is a necessary part of policing, it is inevitable that 
some officers will abuse such discretion. The “supervision of 
subordinates with broad discretion and responsibilities” is especially 
tough, meaning that superiors cannot meaningfully “hold officers 
accountable for everything all the time.”285 Some misconduct is an 
unavoidable part of having a police force.286 Given their discretion and 
 
 283. Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 
(1960) (explaining the necessity of discretion in police work and defining discretion as “the power 
to consider all circumstances and then determine whether any legal action is to be taken” and “if 
so taken, of what kind and degree, and to what conclusion”).  
The academic literature has long observed that, as frontline workers, police officers need 
discretion to complete their jobs. In the past, it has observed that there are two different types of 
discretion in modern police work. First, there is the discretion officers must exercise when they 
decide which laws to enforce most aggressively. Second, there is the discretion officers must 
exercise in how they enforce those laws. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL 
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (observing how 
police, as street-level bureaucrats, have the ability to exercise influence over public policy); 
STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & MICHAEL MUSHENO, COPS, TEACHERS, COUNSELORS: STORIES 
FROM THE FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SERVICE (2003) (analyzing how street-level bureaucrats like 
police officers have to deal with competing tensions of law abidance and cultural abidance); 
Herman Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 POLICE ADMIN. REV. 140 
(1963) (arguing that police officers must make decisions on which laws to enforce rigidly, and 
which laws to enforce less aggressively, thereby shaping the meaning of the law).  
If police did not have the ability to exercise discretion, “the criminal law would be ordered 
but intolerable.” Breitel, supra, at 427. This has been well understood going back to the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which recognized 
the importance of discretion. The authors of that report noted that police “are charged with 
performing [their jobs] where all eyes are upon them and where the going is always roughest, on 
the street.” PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UUB9-4QYB]. 
 284. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN OF JUSTICE, supra note 283, at 91.  
 285. LIPSKY, supra note 283, at 164.  
 286. In the last century, the academic literature has recognized countless examples of how 
police discretion is invariably tied to some misconduct. One of the first national recognitions of 
widespread misconduct among police officers came in 1931, when the National Commission on 
Law Observance and Enforcement, appointed by President Herbert Hoover, released the 
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legal authority to use force, misconduct by police officers can have far 
more serious—and deadly—consequences than misconduct by other 
public employees. A single “bad cop . . . can leave his victim dead or 
permanently damaged, and under the right circumstances one cop’s 
bad call—or a group of cops’ habitual [bad behavior]—can be the spark 
that leaves a city like Baltimore in flames.”287 Thus, there is a 
compelling public policy need for the public to have greater input in 
the development of police disciplinary procedures.  
Second, critics may argue that a transparent and public 
negotiation about disciplinary procedures could reduce efficiency and 
result in fewer genuine, good-faith discussions about the merits of 
different disciplinary regimes. Public participation may result in each 
side appealing to the “lowest common denominator” and pandering to 
constituents during public hearings, rather than engaging in frank 
discussions about the complex array of issues at stake.288 Public 
negotiations may also be less likely to result in amicable compromises, 
as negotiators may be less willing to make trade-offs on particularly 
contentious issues if facing immediate public backlash.289  
Admittedly, closed-door labor negotiations can offer some real 
advantages. However, the risk of such closed-door negotiations is that 
the resulting compromise will not adequately reflect community 
values.290 This risk is heightened in the context of police disciplinary 
procedures in most states, where those individuals who are most at risk 
 
Wickersham Commission Report. Since the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, “no 
fewer than six national commissions [have] examined various dimensions” of police misconduct 
in the United States. Michael S. Scott, Progress in American Policing? Reviewing the National 
Reviews, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 171, 172 (2008). These reports, along with other academic 
research, have found certain categories of misconduct to be common across different policing 
agencies: racial profiling, excessive use of force, unlawful searches and seizures, failures to 
cooperate with investigations involving fellow officers, dishonesty at trial, and the planting of 
evidence. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police 
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59, CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 380–81 
(2010). 
 287. Douthat, supra note 123.  
 288. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1349–
50 (2011) (acknowledging that transparency can create “a decision-making environment in which 
the lowest common denominator dimensions of widespread public involvement would cause bad 
arguments to drive out good ones”). 
 289. See David Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example of the 
European Council of Ministers, in CHRISTOPHER HOOD & DAVID HEALD, TRANSPARENCY: THE 
KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 165, 169 (2006) (stating that “secretive environments help to 
produce compromises in bargaining”).  
 290. See Schauer, supra note 288, at 1348–50 (describing the democratic value of transparency 
in government decisionmaking).  
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from officer wrongdoing have little say in the current collective 
bargaining process. A genuine and frank discussion of police 
disciplinary procedures ought to include the members of the public 
most at risk of falling victim to police brutality.  
Third, some may worry that a public process, particularly at a time 
when police are under significant national scrutiny,291 could swing the 
pendulum in the opposite direction; that is, it may result in virtually no 
procedural protections for officers facing disciplinary investigations. 
While potentially problematic, this result seems highly unlikely. For 
one, police officers are still typically protected by civil service laws that 
establish basic procedures for hiring, promotion, and in some cases 
disciplinary procedures.292 Police officers themselves remain one of the 
most powerful political constituencies in the United States.293  
In fact, police officers are such a powerful political constituency 
that civil rights advocates may worry that even a transparent and public 
process will not correct the underlying problem. Even with more 
transparency and public participation, police unions may still be able 
to lobby local political leaders for excessive procedural protections 
during disciplinary investigations. For evidence of this objection, we 
need look no further than LEOBRs, which state legislatures passed 
after public debate and hearings. If transparency and public 
participation did not prevent the passage of LEOBRs in sixteen states, 
why would it prevent municipalities from passing similarly protective 
measures after a public debate?  
No doubt, increasing transparency and public participation in the 
development of police disciplinary procedures will not cure all 
problems. Many municipalities will still opt for overly protective 
procedures that have the effect of limiting police accountability and 
oversight. Nevertheless, there is still good reason to believe that the 
addition of public participation and transparency will result in more 
balanced disciplinary procedures. Only 32 percent of states have 
passed LEOBRs through their state legislatures, while it appears that 
a higher portion of large municipalities that engage in collective 
 
 291. See generally HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK 
ON LAW AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016) (arguing that the current political 
environment has put unreasonable pressure on police officers, making them less aggressive and 
contributing to an uptick in crime).  
 292. See supra Part I.B.  
 293. See generally Rushin, Using Data, supra note 122, at 135–54 (discussing the political 
power of police groups as compared to the victims of police misconduct and arguing that these 
political barriers make bottom-up, organic police reform challenging).  
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 
2017] POLICE UNION CONTRACTS 1251 
bargaining with their police forces have restricted internal 
investigations in some potentially problematic way.294 In other words, 
police officers have been more successful in obtaining unreasonably 
burdensome procedural protections through the collective bargaining 
process than through more public processes.  
Fourth, some may claim that frontline officers’ inability to 
negotiate disciplinary procedures through the traditional collective 
bargaining process may result in reduced morale and other forms of 
pushback.295 Admittedly, one of the benefits of collective bargaining 
for disciplinary procedures is that it may promote fairness, reduce 
arbitrary discipline, and improve employee morale.296 In other policing 
contexts, there is evidence that external attempts to overhaul 
disciplinary procedures without support from police unions resulted in 
opposition, decreases in enforcement, and ultimately de-policing.297 
From a procedural justice perspective,298 it may be advantageous to 
give frontline police officers or their union representatives a voice in 
the development of disciplinary procedures.  
But none of the proposals in this Article would prevent police 
unions or frontline officers from having a seat at the table in the 
development of police disciplinary procedures. Instead, this Article 
merely proposes opening up the development of police disciplinary 
procedures to the public—either through increasing transparency and 
public participation in the collective bargaining process or through 
 
 294. For a description and evaluation of LEOBRS from fifteen states, see supra Part I.C and 
infra Appendix C.  
 295. See, e.g., Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (manuscript at 28, 52–53) (explaining how 
officers who are excluded from the process of establishing internal disciplinary policies may feel 
“compelled to oppose new policies for fear that the policy will be implemented punitively or 
unfairly as a way to discipline rank and file who are unpopular with management,” and further 
explaining how “failing to give [frontline officers] any voice” in designing internal policies may 
fuel resentment because it communicates to them “just how unimportant their views” are and 
“just how low their status” is within the department).  
 296. Hodges, supra note 70, at 98–99 (“Protection from arbitrary or unjust discipline is a 
primary motivation for employee unionization.”); Charles C. Killingsworth, Grievance 
Adjudication in Public Employment, 13 ARB. J. 3, 15 (1958) (stating that impartial grievance 
procedures are important for employee morale).  
 297. See generally, e.g., Rushin & Edwards, supra note 82 (demonstrating empirically how 
federal intervention in police departments is associated with a temporary uptick in crime rates, 
likely from officers pulling back on street policing).  
 298. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 283, 283 (2003) (“Legal authorities gain when they receive deference and 
cooperation from the public. Considerable evidence suggests that the key factor shaping public 
behavior is the fairness of the processes legal authorities use when dealing with members of the 
public.”). 
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democratizing the development of disciplinary procedures. In either 
scenario, police unions would still play an important role, either as a 
party during contract negotiations or as a powerful political 
constituency during a legislative process.  
This proposal merely provides other stakeholders with a more 
direct role in collaboratively developing disciplinary procedures. While 
transparency and public participation will not prevent all problematic 
provisions in police union contracts, sunlight has proven time and time 
again to be the “best of disinfectants.”299  
CONCLUSION 
Few cases better illustrate the complex relationship between 
police misconduct investigations and labor law than the tragic death of 
Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge. On July 5, 2016, multiple bystanders 
recorded the encounter between Sterling and two Baton Rouge police 
officers.300 These videos appeared to show the officers shooting Sterling 
six times in the chest and back from point-blank range.301 In the 
aftermath of this horrific event, the public was left with more questions 
than answers. Was Sterling armed? Did the officers need to use deadly 
force? And would the disciplinary procedures allow justice to be 
served?  
Labor law protections may make it difficult to answer these 
questions. Under Louisiana’s LEOBR and Baton Rouge’s police union 
contract, officers do not have to answer any questions after a use-of-
force incident for thirty days,302 and internal investigators must 
complete any subsequent investigation within sixty days.303 Even if such 
an investigation results in disciplinary action, all references to 
 
 299. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 300. Richard Fausset, Richard Pérez-Peña & Campbell Robertson, Alton Sterling Shooting in 
Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/07/06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/4BZC-3EGV]. 
 301. Steph Solis, Protests Break Out After Baton Rouge Police Fatally Shoot Man, USA 
TODAY (July 6, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/07/05/baton-
rouge-alton-sterling-police-shooting/86738368/ [https://perma.cc/36DW-2D47]. 
 302. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2531 (2014) (stating that a police officer “shall be granted up to 
thirty days to secure such representation, during which time all questioning shall be suspended”). 
 303. Id. (stating that “each investigation of a police employee or law enforcement officer 
which is conducted under the provisions of this Chapter shall be completed within sixty days”).  
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Sterling’s death will eventually be erased from the officers’ personnel 
records in as few as eighteen months.304  
As this Article demonstrates, Baton Rouge is hardly alone. Across 
America’s largest cities, many police officers receive excessive 
procedural protections during internal disciplinary investigations, 
effectively immunizing them from the consequences of misconduct. 
And so communities of color have taken to the streets to express their 
outrage. Those victimized most by police misconduct have used 
Sterling’s death, and the deaths of so many others, to remind the nation 
that their lives matter.  
Going forward, more research is needed on the relationship 
between state labor law and internal police disciplinary procedures. 
Future studies could compare the content of internal disciplinary 
procedures created through the collective bargaining process with 
those created through alternative processes. Alternatively, future 
studies could compare the content of police union contracts with 
collective bargaining agreements in other fields. These methodologies 
could shed light on whether the unique structure of collective 
bargaining plays any role in the creation of weak disciplinary 
procedures in American police departments.  
But even in the absence of this sort of definitive evidence, there is 
still reason to believe that the public should have more say in the 
development of police accountability mechanisms. For too long, the 
law has excluded the public from the development of these procedures. 
It is time to remove this process from the shadows and make the police 
more accountable to the communities they serve.  
 
 304. CITY OF BATON ROUGE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND 
BATON ROUGE UNION OF POLICE LOCAL 237, at 13 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(establishing a system for purging disciplinary records after anywhere from eighteen months to 
five years, depending on the outcome of the investigation and the severity of the punishment).  
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 
1254  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1191 
APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF MUNICIPALITIES STUDIED305 
Name of Agency Sworn Officers  Name of Agency Sworn Officers 
Abilene 170  Lexington 540 
Akron 412  Lincoln 320 
Albuquerque 864  Little Rock 557 
Anaheim 374  Long Beach 786 
Anchorage 374  Los Angeles 9,907 
Ann Arbor 117  Louisville 1,252 
Aurora 657  Madison 462 
Austin 1,709  Manchester 223 
Bakersfield 370  McAllen 266 
Baltimore 2,779  Memphis 2,233 
Baton Rouge 662  Mesquite 213 
Beaumont 257  Mesa 812 
Bellevue 160  Miami 1,148 
Berkeley 168  Milwaukee 1,890 
Billings 141  Minneapolis 836 
Boise 259  Miramar 194 
Boston 2,151  Modesto 207 
Boulder 174  Naperville 160 
Bridgeport 389  Nashville 1,389 
Brownsville 245  New Haven 458 
Buffalo 737  New York City 34,581 
 
 305. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, tbl. 78: FULL-
TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES BY CITY (2014). 
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Name of Agency Sworn Officers  Name of Agency Sworn Officers 
Burbank 146  Newark 1,014 
Carlsbad 110  Norman 171 
Cedar Rapids 206  North Las Vegas 262 
Chandler 315  Oakland 715 
Chicago 12,034  Oklahoma City 1,041 
Chula Vista 212  Omaha 793 
Cincinnati 961  Ontario 228 
Clearwater 230  Orange 150 
Cleveland 1,476  Orlando 707 
Columbus 1,852  Oxnard 241 
Concord 151  Paterson 398 
Coral Springs 200  Pembroke Pines 231 
Corpus Christi 449  Peoria, AZ 180 
Costa Mesa 113  Peoria, IL 209 
Dallas 3,543  Philadelphia 6,410 
Daly City 111  Phoenix 2,805 
Davenport 160  Pittsburgh 913 
Davie 171  Pomona 157 
Dayton 361  Port St. Lucie 217 
Denton 158  Portland 935 
Denver 1,430  Pueblo 191 
Des Moines 354  Reno 300 
Detroit 2,318  Renton 112 
District of 
Columbia 
3,935  Rialto 100 
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Name of Agency Sworn Officers  Name of Agency Sworn Officers 
Downey 108  Richmond, CA 180 
Duluth 144  Riverside 364 
El Monte 114  Rochester 713 
El Paso 1,069  Rockford 280 
Elgin 173  Roseville 119 
Elk Grove 126  Sacramento 623 
Escondido 153  Salem 181 
Eugene 180  Salinas 135 
Evansville 281  Salt Lake City 428 
Fairfield 112  San Antonio 2,388 
Fontana 183  San Diego 1,876 
Fremont 181  San Francisco 2,137 
Fresno 708  San Jose 966 
Ft. Collins 196  San Leando 136 
Ft. Lauderdale 501  San Mateo 140 
Ft. Wayne 375  Santa Ana 264 
Ft. Worth 1,536  Santa Clara 141 
Fullerton 137  Santa Rosa 166 
Gainesville 297  Seattle 1,323 
Garden Grove 152  Sioux City 244 
Glendale 386  Spokane 295 
Grand Rapids 283  Springfield, MO 302 
Green Bay 190  St. Louis 1,384 
Gresham 120  St. Paul 627 
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Name of Agency Sworn Officers  Name of Agency Sworn Officers 
Hartford 420  St. Petersburg 531 
Hayward 175  Stamford 278 
Henderson 329  Sterling Heights 144 
Hialeah 300  Stockton 371 
Hillsboro 130  Sunnyvale 205 
Hollywood 311  Tacoma 326 
Honolulu 2,093  Tampa 952 
Houston 5,252  Tempe 349 
Huntington Beach 207  Toledo 615 
Indianapolis 1,536  Topeka 287 
Inglewood 162  Torrance 210 
Irvine 200  Tucson 934 
Jacksonville 1,576  Tulsa 765 
Jersey City 790  Vallejo 101 
Joliet 257  Visalia 139 
Kansas City 1,398  Waco 248 
Kent 136  Waterbury 271 
Lansing 192  West Palm Beach 274 
Laredo 442  Wichita 598 
Las Vegas 2,485  Worchester 440 
   
TOTAL 170,625 
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Burbank               
Carlsbad               
Cedar Rapids               
Chandler               
Chicago               
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Cincinnati               
Clearwater               
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Corpus Christi               
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Davenport               
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Downey               
Duluth               
El Monte               
El Paso               
Elgin               
Elk Grove               
Escondido               
Eugene               
Evansville               
Everett               
Fairfield               
Fontana               
Fremont               
Fresno               
Ft. Collins               
Ft. Lauderdale               
Ft. Wayne               
Ft. Worth               
Fullerton               
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Glendale               
Grand Rapids               
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Green Bay               
Gresham               
Hartford               
Hayward               
Henderson               
Hialeah               
Hillsboro               
Hollywood               
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Huntington Beach               
Indianapolis               
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Laredo               
Las Vegas               
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Lincoln               
Little Rock               
Long Beach               
Los Angeles               
Louisville               
Madison               
Manchester               
McAllen               
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Nashville               
New Haven               
New York               
Newark               
Norman               
North Las Vegas               
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Oakland               
Oklahoma City               
Omaha               
Ontario               
Orange, CA               
Orlando               
Oxnard               
Paterson               
Pembroke Pines               
Peoria, AZ               
Peoria, IL               
Philadelphia               
Phoenix               
Pittsburgh               
Pomona               
Port St. Lucie               
Portland               
Pueblo               
Reno               
Renton               
Rialto               
Richmond, CA               
Riverside               
RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2018  11:13 PM 













































































































































Rochester               
Rockford               
Roseville               
Sacramento               
Salem               
Salinas               
Salt Lake City               
San Antonio               
San Diego               
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San Mateo               
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Seattle               
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St. Petersburg               
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Stamford               
Sterling Heights               
Stockton               
Sunnyvale               
Tacoma               
Tampa               
Tempe               
Toledo               
Topeka               
Torrance               
Tucson               
Tulsa               
Vallejo               
Visalia               
Waco               
Washington, D.C.               
Waterbury               
West Palm Beach               
Wichita               
Worchester               
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Arizona        
California               
Delaware               
Florida               
Illinois               
Iowa               
Kentucky               
Louisiana               
Maryland               
Minnesota               
Nevada               
New Mexico               
Rhode Island               
Virginia               
West Virginia               
Wisconsin               
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APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION 
This project would not have been possible without the work done 
by previous researchers—particularly the excellent ongoing work by 
Campaign Zero. Prior examinations of police union contracts and Law 
Enforcement Officer Bills of Rights (LEOBRs) only received brief 
discussion in this Article’s literature review. I offer this Methodological 
Appendix to acknowledge these important studies and more 
thoroughly explain the Article’s methodology.  
I.   CODING SCHEME 
In the methodology section of this Article, I described how I 
“conducted a preliminary examination of the dataset, surveyed the 
existing literature, and consulted media reports” in settling on my 
coding approach. I offered this short explanation with little follow-up. 
I write now to elaborate on my approach. In coding the Article’s 
dataset of 178 contracts, I ultimately adopted on a coding methodology 
that overlaps with that used by the volunteers at Campaign Zero at 
various points in their examination of eighty-one large city union 
contracts over the last two years.306 The coding methodology also 
overlaps with the coding categories considered by the Guardian in their 
evaluation of dozens of union contracts leaked from the Fraternal 
Order of Police (FOP) server.307 This coding methodology overlaps 
with that used by Kevin M. Keenan and Professor Samuel Walker, who 
analyzed how LEOBRs similarly frustrate accountability efforts.308 
And it somewhat resembles a coding methodology used by Reuters in 
an examination of eighty-two police union contracts.309 This study also 
benefitted from earlier work by Professor Walker, identifying how 
specific union contracts and LEOBRs served as barriers to internal 
discipline in American police departments. These important studies 
provided a baseline upon which this study builds. My project would not 
have been possible without their important work. Nevertheless, in a 
 
    306.  CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116.  
 307.  Joseph, supra note 124.  
 308.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79.  
 309.  Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and 
Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5US2-7V9E]. 
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handful of cases, I purposefully deviated from each study in defining 
my coding scheme.  
A.       Prior Research 
The first, and most important recent study is an ongoing project 
spearheaded by DeRay McKesson and Samuel Sinyangwe with the 
group Campaign Zero.310 As of August 7, 2017, Campaign Zero had 
coded a dataset of eighty-one union contracts and fifteen LEOBRs 
according to six variables: (1) whether the contract “[d]isqualif[ies] 
misconduct complaints that are submitted too many days after an 
incident occurs or if an investigation takes too long to complete,” 
(2) whether the contract “[p]revent[s] police officers from 
being interrogated immediately after being involved in an incident 
or otherwise restrict[s] how, when, or where they can be 
interrogated,” (3) whether the contract “[g]iv[es] officers access to 
information that civilians do not get prior to being interrogated,” (4) 
whether the contract “[r]equir[es] cities to pay costs related to police 
misconduct including by giving officers paid leave while under 
investigation, paying legal fees, and/or the cost of settlements,” (5) 
whether the contract “[p]revent[s] information on past 
misconduct investigations from being recorded or retained in an 
officer’s personnel file,” and (6) whether the contract 
“[l]imit[s] disciplinary consequences for officers or limit[s] the 
capacity of civilian oversight structures and/or the media to hold 
police accountable.”311  
Campaign Zero’s coding methodology has evolved over time. 
Their earlier work looked somewhat more narrowly at a smaller 
number of cities and considered fewer coding categories, namely 
when a contract (1) “prevent[s] police officers from being 
interrogated immediately after being involved in an incident,” (2) 
“prevent[s] information on past misconduct [investigations] from 
being recorded or retained in an officer’s personnel file,” (3) 
“disqualif[ies] misconduct complaints submitted 180+ days after an 
incident or that take over 1 year to investigate,” or (4) “limit[s] 
 
 310.  CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116. 
 311.  Id.  
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civilian oversight structures from being given the authority to 
discipline officers for misconduct.”312  
Similarly, George Joseph and the Guardian studied police 
union contracts collected from a hack of the FOP. His analysis went 
to print in February of 2016, and it found that many contracts 
“included provisions barring pubic access to records of past civilian 
complaints, departmental investigations, and disciplinary 
actions.”313 Others attempted to “slow down misconduct 
investigations,” “enable the destruction of complaints and 
disciplinary records after a negotiated period of time,” and delayed 
interrogations.314 It also noted at least one contract that required city 
officials to redirect all complaints against police officers to the 
police department for investigation, making it challenging for a 
person to complain about police conduct with any sort of 
anonymity.315  
In 2005, Kevin M. Keenan and Professor Samuel Walker coded 
the content of fourteen LEOBRs, examining in particular how 
language in these statutes thwarted legitimate police accountability 
efforts.316 Keenan and Walker’s coding, which included around fifty 
variables, took note of several factors that particularly frustrate 
accountability efforts, including LEOBR language that: (1) provides 
officers with notice of investigations and waiting periods that delay 
interrogations,317 (2) prevents civilians from making disciplinary 
decisions,318 (3) gives officers access to arbitration during 
disciplinary appeals,319 (4) establishes a statute of limitations for 
internal disciplinary action,320 (5) limits the retention of disciplinary 
 
 312.  CHECK THE POLICE, https://web.archive.org/web/20160209120722/ http://www.
checkthepolice.org/#project [https://perma.cc/ZFX4-7XZ6] (archived from Feb. 9, 2016) 
[hereinafter CHECK THE POLICE archived]. 
 313.  Joseph, supra note 124. 
 314.  Id.  
 315.  Id.  
 316.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79.  
 317.  Id. at 212–14.  
 318.  Id. at 239 (“Kentucky, Maryland, and Rhode Island restrict the involvement of civilians 
in investigating police misconduct.”).  
 319.  Id. at 233 (stating that “arbitrators have a natural tendency to ‘split the difference’ and 
give something to each side—a practice that results in systematic mitigation of punishment” and 
discussing which laws establish such potentially problematic procedures).  
 320.  Id. at 236–37.  
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histories in personnel files,321 (6) limits the ability of civilians to file 
complaints anonymously,322 (7) sets forth excessive limitations on 
time, place, manner and other technical interview procedures,323 and 
(8) fails to provide adequate exceptions to procedural rules for 
emergency situations.324  It is worth noting that Keenan and Walker 
considered additional factors, many of which they concluded did not 
inhibit accountability efforts in the same way as the factors 
highlighted above.   
In January of 2017, Reade Levinson at Reuters published an 
examination of eighty-two police union contracts from mostly large 
American cities, as well as state LEOBRs.325 This analysis looked at 
whether contracts (1) erased disciplinary records of officers accused 
of misconduct, (2) gave officers access to investigative information 
when they are under investigation for misconduct, (3) disqualified 
complaints from being investigated because of either a time limit or 
because of a requirement that the complainant sign a sworn 
affidavit, (4) allowed officers to forfeit vacation days in lieu of 
suspension, (5) permitted officers to refuse to testify to a civilian 
board, or (6) required officer consent before publicly releasing 
portions of officer personnel files.326  
Finally, Professor Walker has written a number of evaluations 
of police union contracts and LEOBRs over the last several years. 
In a 2015 manuscript published on his website, Professor Walker 
argued that waiting periods that delay officer interrogations after 
alleged misconduct are unsupported by existing scientific 
evidence.327 Earlier that same year, Professor Walker conducted a 
detailed analysis of the ways that the Baltimore police union 
 
 321.  Id. at 240 (stating that “[l]imitations on the retention of citizen complaints and related 
information pose a barrier” to accountability).  
 322.  Id. at 239 (explaining how “[i]n Maryland, complaints alleging police brutality must be 
duly sworn and filed by the complainant, a family member, or a witness within ninety days of the 
incident,” and later arguing that “[n]o LEOBR[] explicitly establish[es] a right of civilians to make 
complaints confidentially or anonymously.”).  
 323.  Id. at 241.  
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Levinson, supra note 309. 
 326.  Id. This study came out in print close in time to the date of my Article’s publication 
and minimally influenced my coding decisions. But because it beat my Article to print, this 
study deserves mention as an important additional contribution to this field.  
 327.  SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE UNION CONTRACT “WAITING PERIODS” FOR 
MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (July 1, 2015), 
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6BNA-QGS4].  
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contract and the Maryland LEOBR combined to thwart officer 
accountability.328 In that manuscript, he argued that these labor 
provisions impaired accountability by providing (1) “[d]elays in 
[i]nvestigating [o]fficer [m]isconduct,” (2) limiting civilian oversight 
by ensuring that officers can “be interrogated only by another sworn 
officer,” (3) regulating the retention of officer personnel records by 
“[e]xpunging [p]erformance [r]ecords,” and limiting discipline from 
officers being placed on “‘[d]o [n]ot [c]all’ [l]ists,” and (4) limiting 
the public transparency of officer investigations.329 
B.        Choice of Variables for Study  
After reviewing these previous studies and conducting an initial 
examination of the dataset, I eventually settled on a coding scheme. 
Admittedly, this coding scheme incorporates some personal 
judgments about the relative problems posed by language in 
collective bargaining agreements. But it also tries to ensure some 
level of consistency with the coding categories identified by previous 
studies in this field. In the end, I believe that this coding scheme is 
consistent with existing studies. It reasonably distinguishes between 
factually distinct categories of contractual terms that can thwart 
accountability efforts. And I believe this scheme is written narrowly, 
so as to avoid establishing variable definitions that unduly capture 
too many ambiguous clauses. The discussion below describes the 
definition for each variable. 
 
1.  Variables Related to Officer Interviews and Interrogations. 
Most of the studies listed above took issue with efforts by police 
union contracts and LEOBRs to give officers an unfair advantage 
during interrogations or interviews. I ultimately settled on two 
variables to signify the most common objections raised in the 
literature. First, all of the previous examinations of police union 
contracts or LEOBRs mentioned above took issue with language 
that delays interrogations of officers accused of misconduct. As 
Keenan and Walker argued, “[d]elays in the investigation of police 
misconduct are intolerable. There is a widespread impression that 
 
 328.  SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT AND THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’S BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY (May 2015), 
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/BALTIMORE-POLICE-UNION-
CONTRACTFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQJ7-W9RG].  
 329.  Id. at 2–7.   
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delays in investigations allow officers time to collude to create a 
consistent, exculpatory story.”330 Campaign Zero appears to agree 
with this sentiment, as they included this variable in their earlier 
coding and appear to include it in their more recent coding as well.331  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, in cases where 
an officer is accused of criminal behavior, the officer has a 
constitutional right to secure a lawyer before the interrogation may 
begin.332 This raises a tricky question: how long can investigators 
delay interviews of officers after an incident without impairing 
accountability? As Keenan and Walker observed back in 2005, there 
is “no literature or scholarship adequately exploring or elaborating 
this issue.”333 
During my initial evaluation of the dataset, I noted that a 
number of contracts provided officers with the opportunity to delay 
the interrogation for a “reasonable” period of time, often until an 
officer could secure representation. Others provided officers with a 
set waiting time before which investigators could initiate an 
interview (for example, twenty-four hours, or until investigators 
have satisfied specific procedural and investigative hurdles, like the 
interviewing of other witnesses). While “reasonable” waiting 
periods to allow officers to secure representation could be abused, 
in my estimation, waiting periods that designate set lengths of time 
are more inflexible and therefore even more troublesome.334 Thus, I 
define the variable “Delays Interrogations of Officers Suspected of 
Misconduct” somewhat narrowly so as to only include provisions 
that delay officer interviews for some designated length of time.  
 
 330.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 212. Walker expressed similar disagreement with 
waiting periods in his previous writing. See Walker, supra note 328, at 2. 
 331.  CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116; CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312.  
 332.  See generally Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (preventing states from 
using compelled statements made by police officers during disciplinary investigations in 
future criminal proceedings).  
 333.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 213.  
 334.  This viewpoint is reinforced by Keenan and Walker’s conclusion that an acceptable 
delay provision may give officers a “reasonable period prior to a formal interrogation” in order 
to secure representation, if needed. Id. at 214. A reasonable period of time may be between six 
and twenty-four hours, but it should be able to be waived by the chief of police under some 
circumstances. Id. In addition, departments should have the ability to “sequester” officers 
suspected of misconduct during this delay period. Id. Keenan and Walker also observe how 
departments sometimes interpret waiting periods that last a set length of time as the de facto 
minimum waiting period for conducting all investigatory activity. Id. This, in my estimation, 
suggests that it may be fair to distinguish between contracts that establish a “reasonable” waiting 
period and those that establish a waiting period for a set length of time.  
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Second, at least two of the prior studies raised questions about 
provisions in union contracts and LEOBRs that provide officers 
with access to information about an investigation before initiating a 
disciplinary interview. Campaign Zero most prominently 
recognized this in their more recent coding of police union contracts, 
which examines whether the contract “giv[es] officers access to 
information that civilians do not get prior to being interrogated.”335 
The Reuters study somewhat similarly defined this variable as 
whether or not the contract gives officers access to “all investigative 
materials.”336 The definition used by the Reuters study seems overly 
restrictive in my judgment, while the coding definition used by 
Campaign Zero seems to strike a sensible balance. The Reuters 
definition potentially fails to capture a number of clauses in police 
union contracts that provide officers with access to only some, but 
not all, incriminating evidence an investigator may have against 
them before interrogations. Thus, I ultimately chose to define this 
variable similarly to Campaign Zero, as whether the contract 
“provides officers with access to evidence before interviews or 
interrogations about alleged wrongdoing.” In applying this coding, 
I defined evidence to include something more substantial than a 
summary or appraisal of basic facts about an allegation of 
misconduct.  
It is worth noting that I chose not to include a number of 
interrogation-related variables that other researchers considered in 
one way or another. I believe these generally do not present 
meaningful barriers to police accountability. For example, 
Campaign Zero takes issue with contracts that regulate “how, when, 
and where [officers] can be interrogated.”337 Indeed, my initial 
review of the dataset revealed many cases where union contracts 
prevented officers from being subject to abusive or threatening 
comments,338 unreasonably long interrogations,339 and 
 
 335.  CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116. 
 336.  Levinson, supra note 309.  
 337.  CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116. 
 338.  See, e.g., CITY OF BELLEVUE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF BELLEVUE AND 
THE BELLEVUE POLICE OFFICERS GUILD 4 (2011) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating 
that employees should not experience any offensive language or “abusive questioning”).  
 339.  See, e.g., CITY OF PORTLAND, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PORTLAND POLICE 
ASSOCIATION AND THE CITY OF PORTLAND 36 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(“Interviews shall not be overly long.”). 
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inducements.340 Some also provided officers with access to 
transcripts or recordings of interrogations,341 or required that 
interrogations happen at reasonable times and locations.342 On this 
point, I tend to side with Keenan and Walker. They have argued that 
“[l]imitations on time, place, and duration of interrogations are 
reasonable, respect the officer as an individual and as an employee, 
aid in the search for the truth, and pose no barrier to 
accountability.”343 I also adopt Professor Kate Levine’s view that 
such accommodations for officers during interrogations should 
serve as models for how the criminal justice system ought to treat all 
suspects.344 Humane limitations on interrogations, whether in the 
context of the public or police officers, do less to limit accountability 
and more to avoid “intimidation and fatigue that might lead to false 
confessions or long-term hostility between the officer and his 
supervisors.”345 These humane limitations on interrogation are 
factually distinguishable from defined waiting periods, or provisions 
that provide officers with access to evidence before questioning.  
2. Variables Related to the Investigation and Adjudication of 
Complaints.  I considered four variables related to the investigation 
and adjudication of complaints. First, I included a variable related 
to civilian oversight of investigations and adjudications of 
complaints against officers. Campaign Zero, Keenan and Walker, 
and the Guardian each raised some concern about how LEOBRs 
and union contracts can limit meaningful civilian involvement in the 
oversight of law enforcement misconduct. Campaign Zero’s latest 
coding views this issue more expansively as a problem of limitations 
on “disciplinary consequences for officers or limit[ations on] the 
 
 340.  See, e.g., CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, 
TEXAS AND THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 81 (2009) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (barring the use of “inducements” during interrogations of police officers).  
 341.  See, e.g., CITY OF SALEM, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
CITY OF SALEM AND THE SALEM POLICE EMPLOYEES’ UNION 42 (2014) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (providing officers with the ability to have interrogations recorded, and have access 
to that recording).  
 342.  See, e.g., CITY OF TAMPA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF TAMPA AND POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC. 78 (2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)  (providing that 
interrogations of officers should be conducted at a “reasonable hour, preferably at a time when 
the employee is on duty”).  
 343.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 217–18.  
 344.  Levine, supra note 79, at 1236–41. 
 345.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 218. 
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capacity of civilian oversight structures and/or the media to hold 
police accountable.”346 Keenan and Walker found that multiple 
LEOBRs “restrict[ed] the involvement of civilians in investigating 
misconduct,”347 and still others established hearing boards filled 
entirely by fellow police officers—leaving no room for civilians.348 
As they argued, such clauses are unreasonably “dismissive of the 
public interest in police accountability.”349 And the Guardian 
concluded that many contracts left out civilians from the 
adjudication of complaints against officers, by ensuring that “most 
of the investigations into police are led by officers’ supervisors 
within the department.”350  
I defined my variable somewhat more narrowly than the current 
coding used by Campaign Zero, and more in line with the definition 
used by Keenan and Walker and the Guardian. While civilian 
oversight is certainly important, it is also necessary to cabin the 
definition of civilian oversight so as to avoid creating a category that 
groups together too many different policies. There is widespread 
agreement in the policing literature that civilian involvement in the 
intake and adjudication of civilian complaints is important for 
accountability. There is more ambiguity, though, about whether the 
public ought to have access to officers’ personnel files, officers’ 
personal information, or details about ongoing internal 
investigations. These raise more complicated privacy issues.  
In my judgment, the exclusion of civilians from the 
decisionmaking process during disciplinary decisions is also 
distinguishable from the use of arbitration, which I chose to code 
separately as discussed in more depth below.351 Given these 
 
 346.  Campaign Zero’s earlier coding approach included a similar variable, defined as 
language that “limit[s] civilian oversight structures from being given the authority to 
discipline officers for misconduct.” CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312.  
 347.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 239.  
 348.  Id. at 225–26.  
 349.  Id. at 226 (saying that these procedures “effectively bar[] civilian participation in the 
discipline oversight process.”).  
 350.  Joseph, supra note 124.  
 351.  For example, I would argue that arbitration is even more antidemocratic than vesting 
the authority to make disciplinary decisions in the hands of a police chief. A police chief is 
generally answerable to an elected mayor and city council, providing some layer of accountability. 
By contrast, an arbitrator may not even be a resident of the community, and his or her decision is 
often deemed final and unreviewable thereafter. Arbitration also generally happens after an 
officer has exhausted alternative appeals of his or her disciplinary penalty. This provides good 
reason to code these two variables separately, as they raise separate policy concerns.  
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concerns, I focused my analysis in this area somewhat narrowly on 
whether a contract “Limits Civilian Oversight,” defined as whether 
the “contract prohibits civilian groups from acquiring authority to 
investigate, discipline, or terminate police officers for alleged 
wrongdoing.” 
Second, I coded contracts based on whether they “Permit or 
Require Arbitration.” While this sort of a variable receives less 
explicit attention in the current Campaign Zero coding,352 Walker 
and Keenan expressed concern in their study about how arbitration 
may unjustifiably reduce disciplinary penalties against police.353 This 
is consistent with evidence and hypotheses from previous research. 
For example, prior work by Mark Iris indicated that mandatory 
arbitration contributed in disciplinary action in Chicago and 
Houston being cut roughly in half for officers on appeal.354 Professor 
Seth Stoughton has similarly written on how collective bargaining 
may contribute to lengthy procedures for adjudicating disciplinary 
appeals, including arbitration clauses that may frustrate 
accountability efforts.355 This suggests that arbitration is a 
potentially important category for consideration as a standalone 
variable. Thus, I included in my scheme a variable that tests whether 
the contract “permits or requires arbitration of disputes related to 
penalties or termination.”  
Third, at least two of the studies described above object to 
limitations on anonymous civilian complaints.356  Keenan and 
Walker argued that policies that prevent any anonymous complaints 
may not “address or deal with the potential for officers to intimidate 
 
 352.  Campaign Zero did not appear to include a coding category for this variable in their 
initial scheme. Their current category, which considers whether a contract limits “disciplinary 
consequences for officers or limit[s] the capacity of civilian oversight structures and/or the 
media to hold police accountable[,]” appears to be constructed broadly enough to include 
arbitration. CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116.  
 353.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 233 (“Some observers . . . believe that arbitrators 
have a natural tendency to ‘split the difference’ and give something to each side—a practice that 
results in systematic mitigation of punishment.”).  
 354.  Iris, supra note 113; Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Houston: The Arbitration 
Experience, 5 POLICE Q. 132 (2002). 
 355.  Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2210 (describing how an arbitration decision may be 
improper, but unreviewable because of court precedent). 
 356.  While Campaign Zero does not appear to have coding language that would capture 
limitations on anonymous complaints, it has noted elsewhere that such policies are 
potentially worrisome. CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312 (noting in the text of the 
website that bans on anonymous complaints are an additional concern). 
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2018  8:36 AM 
2017] POLICE UNION CONTRACTS xi 
and retaliate against complainants.”357 I share Keenan and Walker’s 
concerns,358 as discussed in Part IV.D of the Article. Thus, I included 
a variable that considers whether each contract “prohibits 
supervisors from interrogating, investigating, or disciplining officers 
on the basis of anonymous civilian complaints.”  
Fourth, I included a variable in my analysis that considers 
whether the union contract “limits the length of investigation or 
establishes [a] statute of limitations” on the imposition of discipline. 
This variable mirrors a similar variable used by Campaign Zero, 
which “[d]isqualif[ies] misconduct complaints that are submitted 
too many days after an incident occurs or if an investigation takes 
too long to complete.”359 It mirrors a variable considered by Reuters, 
which identified contracts that disqualified complaints from being 
investigated because of either a time limit or because of a 
requirement that the complainant sign a sworn affidavit. This 
variable also mirrors the analysis conducted by Keenan and Walker 
on statutes of limitations for officer discipline. They found multiple 
LEOBRs had such limitations. Based on this, they argued that while 
“[p]olice departments should not be given an unlimited amount of 
time to hold a hearing after charges have been filed,” officers 
similarly should not be able to avoid accountability simply because 
of a backlog of cases.360  
In fact, “[s]ome activists suspect that delays in [the processing 
of some civilian complaints] are part of a police department’s 
deliberate strategy” to skirt responsibility for wrongdoing.361 
Statutes of limitations can exacerbate this problem. There is no 
uniform agreement among policing scholars about the appropriate 
length of such statute of limitations. Keenan and Walker 
recommend that investigators might need anywhere between ninety 
days and three years to complete an investigation or hand down 
punishment, depending on the severity of the infraction.362 But these 
numbers appear to be based more on their independent judgments 
 
 357.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 240.  
 358.  These authors go as far as arguing explicitly that cities and state should “accept 
anonymous and oral complaints . . . .” Id.  
 359.  Campaign Zero’s earlier coding category for this topic focused specifically on whether 
the contract “disqualif[ies] misconduct complaints submitted 180 days after an incident or 
that take over 1 year to investigate.” CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312.  
 360.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 237.  
 361.  Id.  
 362.  Id.  
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than on empirical evidence. Given the general lack of consensus on 
this point, I ultimately included no time limitation on my definition 
of this variable.   
 
3. Variable Related to Personnel Records.  Finally, virtually all of 
the prior projects discussed above showed some concern for labor 
arrangements that remove records of complaints and disciplinary 
action from officers’ personnel files. Keenan and Walker pointed out 
that LEOBR limits on the retention of information in officer personnel 
files could be fatal to one of the most important tools for police 
accountability: early intervention systems (EIS). These are “data-
based management tools containing systematic information of officer 
performance, including, but not limited to, citizen complaints, officer 
use-of-force reports, and officer involvement in civil litigation.”363 
Police manager then examine this accumulated data to identify officers 
that may be engaged in repeated or troubling patterns of misconduct. 
Supervisors then subject these officers to “informal, non-disciplinary 
intervention designed to correct their performance problems,” before 
they elevate into something more serious.364 By removing officer 
performance data from an EIS, union contractual terms and LEOBRs 
may thwart this critically important misconduct prevention tool. 
Additionally, the Guardian noted how some contracts that they studied 
“enabled the destruction of complaints and disciplinary records after a 
negotiated period of time.”365 
I have signified this variable in a manner similar to that used by 
Campaign Zero and the Guardian, as “Limits Consideration of 
Disciplinary History,” which I defined as any contract that 
“mandates the destruction or purging of disciplinary records from 
personnel files after a set length of time, or limits the consideration 
of disciplinary records in future employment actions.”  
II.  DATASET 
The dataset of 178 police union contracts366 that I examined in this 
Article overlaps with Campaign Zero’s examination of eighty-one 
 
 363.  Id. at 241.  
 364.  Id.  
 365.  Joseph, supra note 124.  
 366.  It is also worth reiterating that some of the contracts I studied have since lapsed and 
been replaced with new bargaining agreements. I do not believe this is fatal to my limited, 
academic endeavor. There is little reason to think that the content of the typical collective 
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large cities and Reuters examination of eighty-two large cities. It is 
particularly important to recognize the impressive work previously 
done by Campaign Zero to collect dozens of contemporary contracts 
and make them available online for public consumption. In doing my 
analyses, I tried when possible to utilize the most up-to-date contracts 
available through municipal websites, state websites, and record 
requests. It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of 
municipalities discussed in this Article regularly post their 
community’s most up-to-date collective bargaining agreements on 
their websites or in state repositories.367 Finally, it is important to 
 
bargaining agreements has changed in any systematic way from one year to the next. Given the 
large number of contracts in the collection of 178 contracts studied that had at least one 
questionable clause that could impede accountability (around 88 percent), I believe my study has 
accomplished its primary objective. I have regularly updated the dataset and have added a 
considerable number of contracts to my database, which contains over 1,000 union contract 
documents from municipalities, most of which have populations of at least 30,000 residents.  
 367.  See, e.g., City of Gresham, Oregon, Human Res., Labor Contracts, CITY OF GRESHAM, 
https://greshamoregon.gov/HR-Labor-Contracts [https://perma.cc/5N3Z-N4VY]; City of Miami, 
Dep’t of Human Res., Labor Relations, Collective Bargaining Agreements/Union Contracts, CITY 
OF MIAMI, http://www.miamigov.com/employeerel/pages/labor/union_contracts.aspasp 
[https://perma.cc/FBQ7-A9N3]; City of Minneapolis, Human Res. Dep’t, Labor Agreements, 
CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.minneapolismn.gov/hr/laboragreements [https://
perma.cc/48J9-DLJF]; City of Peoria, Human Resources, Labor Contracts, CITY OF PEORIA, 
http://www.peoriagov.org/human-resources [https://perma.cc/P2AB-W46M]; City of San Diego, 
Human Res., Employee Organization Agreements, https://www.sandiego.gov/humanresources/
laborrelations/agreements [https://perma.cc/X7V3-6MCM]; City of San Jose, Office of the City 
Manager, Labor Relations Information, CITY OF SAN JOSE, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/
index.aspx?NID=505 [https://perma.cc/H5VY-QZXZ]; Municipality of Anchorage, Emp. 
Relations, Collective Bargaining Agreements, MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, https://
www.muni.org/Departments/employee_relations/Pages/CBA09.aspx [https://perma.cc/C4QV-
8V82]; City of St. Petersburg, Human Res.., Labor Relations Division: Union Agreements, CITY 
OF ST. PETERSBURG, http://www.stpete.org/city_departments/human_resources/labor_
relations_division.php [https://perma.cc/X4Z2-BVKM]. Among the cities studied in this Article, 
the following municipalities make updated copies of their contracts freely and publicly accessible 
through either local or state websites: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, San 
Antonio, San Diego, San Jose, Jacksonville, San Francisco, Austin, Columbus, Detroit, 
Baltimore, Boston, Seattle, Washington D.C., Denver, Louisville, Milwaukee, Portland, Tucson, 
Fresno, Sacramento, Long Beach, Omaha, Miami, Cleveland, Tulsa, Oakland, Minneapolis, 
Anaheim, Tampa, Aurora, Santa Ana, Corpus Christi, Cincinnati, Anchorage, Stockton, Toledo, 
St. Paul, Newark, Buffalo, Lincoln,  Henderson, Jersey City, St. Petersburg, Chula Vista, Orlando, 
Laredo, Madison, Glendale, Reno, North Las Vegas, Fremont, Irvine, Rochester, Des Moines, 
Modesto, Akron, Tacoma, Oxnard, Fontana, Little Rock, Huntington Beach, Grand Rapids, Salt 
Lake City, Worcester, Garden Grove, Santa Rosa, Fort Lauderdale, Port St. Lucie, Ontario, 
Tempe, Eugene, Salem, Peoria (AZ), Peoria (IL), Sioux City, Sioux Falls, Elk Grove, Rockford, 
Salinas, Pomona, Joliet, Paterson, Torrance, Bridgeport, Hayward, Escondido, Dayton, Orange, 
Fullerton, New Haven, Topeka, Cedar Rapids, Elizabeth, Hartford, Visalia, Gainesville, 
Bellevue, Concord, Coral Springs, Roseville, Evansville, Santa Clara, Springfield, Vallejo, 
Lansing, Ann Arbor, El Monte, Berkeley, Downey, Norman, Waterbury, Costa Mesa, 
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acknowledge other groups that have also made a number of police 
union contracts available online, including Labor Relations 
Information Systems,368 the Better Government Association,369 and the 
Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas.370 Finally, I owe a 
debt of gratitude to the research assistants who assisted me with 
background research, data collection, coding, and open record 
requests.  
III.  DATA PRESENTATION 
Previous studies have adopted different methods for presenting 
their data on the content of police union contract and LEOBRs. 
When analyzing only fourteen LEOBRs, Walker and Keenan 
utilized charts that placed the jurisdiction on the horizontal axis and 
the coding category on the vertical axis.371 They likely made this 
choice, in part, because they needed to represent around fifty 
different coding variables.372 They signified the presence of most 
variables with a “Y” (signifying the variable was present in that 
jurisdiction) or a blank rectangle (signifying that the variable was 
not present in that jurisdiction).373 While this sort of data 
presentation is helpful, it would be impractical to recreate such an 
approach for the dataset of 178 contracts studied in this Article.  
 
Manchester, Elgin, Clearwater, Gresham, Carlsbad, Fairfield, Billings, Richmond (CA), 
Burbank, Everett, Palm Bay, Daly City, Davenport, Rialto, Kent, Davie, Hillsboro, Renton, 
Sunnyvale, Duluth, San Leandro, and San Mateo. Additionally, Nevada, Ohio, New York, and 
New Jersey are just a few of the states that have established state repositories for local union 
contracts. See, e.g., State of Nevada, Local Gov’t Emp.-Mgmt. Relations Bd., Collective 
Bargaining Agreements, STATE OF NEVADA, http://emrb.nv.gov/Resources/Collective_
Bargaining_Agreements/ [https://perma.cc/E2XX-UQWC]; State of New Jersey, Pub. Emp’t 
Relations Comm’n, Public Sector Contracts, STATE OF NEW JERSEY http://www.perc.state.nj.us/
publicsectorcontracts.nsf [https://perma.cc/TC2G-85NN]; State of Ohio, State Emp’t Relations 
Bd., Collective Bargaining Agreements, STATE OF OHIO, http://www.serb.state.oh.us/
sections/research/WEB_CONTRACTS/WebContracts.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6HY-472Y]. 
 368.  LRIS Public Safety Contract Library, LAB. REL. INFO. SYS., https://www.lris.com/
contracts/index.php [https://perma.cc/7ZVE-8SVR]. 
 369. Collective Bargaining Database, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N, http://www.bettergov.org/
collective-bargaining-database (focusing specifically on contracts for public agencies in the 
Chicago region).  
 370.  Contracts, COMBINED L. ENFORCEMENT ASS’NS TEX. (CLEAT), 
https://www.cleat.org/contracts [https://perma.cc/3B89-4U9E]. 
 371.  Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 245 app.A.  
 372.  Id.  
 373.  Id.  
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By contrast, the Guardian provided a mere written summary 
describing the frequency of problematic provisions in their analysis 
of dozens of contracts obtained from the FOP server.374 They 
generally did not identify how they coded individual jurisdictions. 
This may have been because of the nature of the data, as a hacker 
had allegedly acquired the information unlawfully.  
In my judgment, Campaign Zero presented coded data from a 
large collection of police union contracts and LEOBRs in a more 
useful format than any of the previous studies. Since Campaign Zero 
has now studied eighty-one contracts using a coding scheme that has 
varied from anywhere between four and six variables, they 
organized the cities on the vertical axis and the coding variable on 
the horizontal axis. They then indicated whether a variable was 
present by shading in a box (or previously placing an image) 
underneath each variable, across from the name of the city with such 
contractual terms. This approach to data presentation is nearly 
identical to that used by the Urban Institute in their coding of state 
laws on body-worn cameras,375 and that used by Upturn and the 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights in their coding 
of municipal policies on body-worn cameras.376  It also resembles 
that used by the Brennan Center in their coding of municipal body-
worn camera policies.377  
Given that this Article examined a relatively large dataset (178 
contracts) and a small number of variables (seven), I opted to 
present the data in a manner consistent with the efforts by Campaign 
Zero, the Urban Institute, Upturn, the Leadership Conference on 
Civil and Human Rights, and the Brennan Center—that is, with the 
variables on the horizontal axis, and the police departments’ names 
on the vertical axis. I believe that this graphical format is superior 
to the line graphs used by Reuters or the written summaries used by 
the Guardian, which fail to inform the reader about the relative 
frequency of questionable clauses in individual municipalities. I owe 
 
 374.  Joseph, supra note 124.  
 375. Police Body-Worn Camera Legislation Tracker, URBAN INST., https://apps-staging.
urban.org/features/body-camera-update [https://perma.cc/QX2H-MTJQ]. 
 376.  UPTURN & LEADERSHIP CONF. CIV. & HUM. RTS., POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: A 
POLICY SCORECARD, https://www.bwcscorecard.org. 
 377.  Police Body Camera Policies: Privacy and the First Amendment Protections, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-
policies-privacy-and-first-amendment-protections [https://perma.cc/W2J5-VYHT]. 
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a debt of gratitude to prior researchers for providing such a useful 
model for presenting this sort of a dataset.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize the limitations of 
this format. This coding methodology can lead to imprecise or 
misleading graphical representations. I chose to code each contract 
based on whether or not it fit within the parameters of the variable 
definitions described in Figure 1. I made 1,246 coding decisions. Of 
these 1,246 coding decisions, I identified around 5 percent of these 
decisions as borderline cases. That is, in around 5 percent of all these 
coding decisions, it was not immediately obvious whether the terms 
of a union contract clearly fit within the stated definitions for a 
variable.  
For example, the Honolulu contract provides officers with a 
copy of a complaint before an interview.378 Does that qualify as 
“provid[ing] officers with access to evidence” before an 
interrogation? The contract in San Francisco gives an officer access 
to incriminating evidence seventy-two hours before possibly 
undergoing an investigatory hearing interview.379 Does that qualify 
as “provid[ing] officers with access to evidence before interviews or 
interrogations,” and does it qualify as delaying an interview? The 
Pittsburgh contract permits anonymous complaints, but requires 
such complaints to have additional corroboration.380 Does this 
qualify as “prohibiting supervisors from interrogating, investigating, 
or disciplining officers” based on an anonymous complaint? While 
the contract in San Diego purges disciplinary files after a set length 
of time, it allows supervisors to consider some prior disciplinary 
sanctions in future employment actions if the sanctions “show 
patterns of specific similar police misconduct.”381 Do these 
contractual terms qualify as limiting the consideration of 
disciplinary history? And what if a contract, like that in St. 
 
 378.  STATE OF HAWAII, supra note 180, at 21.  
 379.  CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO AND SAN FRANCISCO POLICE OFFICERS’ 
ASSOCIATION, AT 13-14 (2007) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 380.  CITY OF PITTSBURGH, WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH 
AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE FORT PITT LODGE NO. 1, AT 126 (2010) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal).  
 381.  CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 159, at 54.  
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Petersburg,382 Tampa,383 or Joliet384 explicitly reference or 
incorporate a state LEOBR or a local ordinance related to officer 
disciplinary investigations? Should such references or 
incorporations count for the purpose of this study?  
Coding these borderline cases proved challenging. The binary 
representations used in Figure 2, Appendix B, and Appendix C do 
not fully represent the ambiguity involved in a handful of coding 
decisions. In about half of these borderline cases, I ultimately coded 
the variable as present. Nevertheless, there is certainly room for 
reasonable disagreement in some of the borderline coding decisions 
reached in this Article. Different coding techniques may have 
resulted in variations in a small number of coding decisions. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that this limitation undermines the 
central argument of this paper—that a substantial number of these 
contracts contain internal disciplinary procedures that thwart 
accountability efforts.  
IV.  CLOSING THOUGHTS 
It may be helpful to conclude this methodological appendix with 
a brief note on the limits of this project. This Article aimed to 
contribute to an academic literature on the complex tension between 
collective bargaining and accountability efforts in American police 
departments. It hoped to provide useful background on the history of 
police labor laws, explore how many police union contracts impede 
reasonable accountability efforts, and ultimately offer normative 
recommendations for reforming state-level collective bargaining 
statutes. While this Article cannot claim to prove that the collective 
bargaining process causes lax internal disciplinary procedures, it 
bolsters the emerging hypothesis that the legal procedure used to 
negotiate police union contracts can be susceptible to a form of 
regulatory capture. This should inspire more research by future legal 
scholars into the relationship between the collective bargaining process 
and lax disciplinary procedures in American police departments.  
 
 382.  CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG AND SUN 
COAST POLICE BENEVOLENT FOR POLICE OFFICERS AND TECHNICIANS, at 2 (2016). 
 383.  CITY OF TAMPA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF TAMPA AND TAMPA POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., at 81 (2016). 
 384.  CITY OF JOLIET, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF JOLIET 
AND ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LABOR COUNCIL, at 31 (2012).  
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Nevertheless, the empirical component of this project will soon be 
out-of-date. Most police unions negotiate new collective bargaining 
agreements every few years. Many of the contracts used in this Article 
have already lapsed or will lapse in the near future. Those interested in 
the constantly changing world of police union contracts in large 
American cities should consult advocacy resources like Campaign 
Zero, which continues to do important work on the frontlines of this 
issue, as well as other police policy issues. You can access their 
important work on police union contracts and learn how to become 
involved in their efforts at http://www.checkthepolice.org.  
 
